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The first essay examines insider trading before, during, and after the October, 2008
stock market crash. I show that inside traders did not appear to predict the crash in the
aggregate by selling big before the crash. They also were not able to predict whether
their stocks would lose especially badly during the crash individually at either long or
short horizons. However, insiders bought in very large numbers immediately after the
crash, and were especially active buyers in small firms, high book-to-market firms, and
high-beta firms. The insiders who bought during this period successfully predicted
post-crash returns that are substantially larger and longer-lasting than the prior
literature on insider trading shows for normal trading periods. These results are similar
to those in a previous study (Seyhun (1990)) on the 1987 crash. This new evidence of
no pre-crash prediction followed by large post-crash returns to insider trading portfolios,
combined with Seyhun’s (1990) results, suggest this may be a pattern in widescale
market crashes.
ii

The second essay presents a model of rational greater-fool asset bubbles that, unlike
previous models, includes risk averse agents. Risk aversion allows us to more realistically
examine the welfare implications of using central bank policy to prevent speculative
bubbles. This improves on previous models in Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) and
Conlon (2015) because they assume risk neutrality among the agents in the market, and
therefore cannot comment on the implications of risk aversion for the welfare effects of
bubble policy. This paper’s results should better inform policy makers on the full costs
and benefits of trying to calm swings in asset markets. Comparative dynamics results
suggest that a policy of general deflation of overpriced assets is welfare diminishing for
buyers, but has ambiguous effects for sellers. We go on to prove that under the
reasonable assumption that utility is diminishing in absolute risk aversion, welfare for
buyers in the asset market will always be harmed by the general deflation policy.
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ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym

Definition

ARA

Absolute Risk Aversion

CAPM

Capital Asset Pricing Model

CARA

Constant Absolute Risk Aversion

CRRA

Constant Relative Risk Aversion

DARA

Decrasing Absolute Risk Aversion

EMH

Efficient Markets Hypothesis

FF

Fama-French 3-factor model

IARA

Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For as long as there have been asset markets, there have been asset market panics and
crashes. The earliest western capital markets, those for the debt and equity issued by
the first joint-stock companies such as the South Sea Company (1720) and the
Mississippi Company (also 1720), have shown a propensity to vacillate wildly causing
great harm to both those within the market, and those without. These wild fluctuations
in the price of asset markets has persisted through the decades to the present day.
Many of these instances, such as the Japanese asset market crash (late 1980s), and the
global subprime mortgage crisis (2000-2008) have been blamed for widespread economic
consequences beyond the asset markets themselves. However, despite the long and
infamous history of asset market panics and crashes, we still know precious little about
them. What causes wild swings in prices in asset markets? To what extent do they
damage the economy? Whose information is most important, and how does the market
internalize this information? What can be done to prevent these wild swings in prices
(if anything at all)? All of these questions are of first-order importance for the field of
economics to explain. This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the existing body of
knowledge of financial crises.
The first essay details the stock market crash of 2008. Specifically, we focus on
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the information communicated by inside traders, those traders with a significant
informational advantage about a single firm. We ask whether or not inside traders were
able to predict the crash of 2008 by selling early, and whether or not they could predict
which stocks would recover the best after the crash.
The answer to the first question, whether or not inside traders could have
predicted the crash, is a tentative “no”. We test the hypothesis by gathering
information on inside traders leading up to the stock market crash in the second week of
October, 2008, then matching the level of insider activity with their stocks’ returns
during the crash. We compare the returns of those stocks whose insiders bought most
actively with those whose insiders sold most actively. No apparent pattern is detected.
Inside traders seemed not to be able to forecast the crash in the aggregate, nor could
they individually forecast if their stocks would do better or worse during the crash.
While these results suggest that inside traders did not predict the stock market crash of
2008, we cannot say for sure that they were completely unable to do so. Recent
developments in finance now make it possible to identify which inside traders are
trading on information, and which are trading for routine portfolio rebalancing
purposes. We leave these concerns to future research.
The answer to the second question, whether or not inside traders could predict
whether their own stocks would outperform the market in the post-crash period, is a
resounding “yes”. Inside traders who bought their stock most actively in the weeks
immediately after the crash outperformed those who sold their stocks most actively by a
wide margin - much wider than the literature suggests exists during normal trading
periods. That this result appears without any filtering of routine inside traders out of
2

the sample is remarkable. The pattern is also robust to controlling for the usual factors
as well. Comparing stocks on the basis of market capitalization, leverage, and risk does
not alter the results. We add some discussion about whether or not the existence of
these returns constitute some evidence against the Efficient Markets Hypothesis of
Fama (1968). We conclude that this is not likely given that traders in 2008 had very
little prior experience with widespread market crashes, and thus had no way to know
where to look for profit, and thus, could not arbitrage it away.
The second essay examines the hypothesis that a central bank can protect
investors by calming down wild swings in the prices of assets. We begin by recreating a
market that develops an asset bubble with fully rational agents with heterogeneous
preferences and uncertainty. In certain states of the world, there exist “bad sellers” who
know that the asset is overpriced. However, there are other states where there exist
honest “good sellers” who think the asset has value. Buyers, however, cannot
distinguish between the two types of sellers, and thus, may wind up buying from a bad
seller. An asset bubble develops because in certain states of the world, two bad sellers
might try to sell to each other, not knowing that the other is also a bad seller. Thus we
wind up with a state of the world where everybody knows the asset has a value of zero,
and yet the asset curiously has a positive price.
From here we assume the existence of a central bank which knows for sure when
at least one agent knows the asset is overpriced. In these states of the world, the central
bank announces this fact which pushes the price of the asset down to zero, preventing
bad sellers from taking advantage of naive buyers. However, this policy causes an
interesting unintended consequence. In the states of the world where the central bank
3

does not announce that the asset is overpriced, buyers are encouraged to offer higher
prices since they know for sure that they are no longer buying an asset from a bad
seller. So while the buyer benefits by being prevented from purchasing an overpriced
asset in some states of the world, he is harmed by paying a higher price in other states.
Thus, the a priori expectation of the effect of the policy on buyers is ambiguous.
We first perform some numerical comparative dynamics experiments to shed
some light on whether or not the policy is helpful to buyers in the asset market using
numerical examples both derived analytically, and through fixed-point methods.
Afterwards, we are able to prove that, for a general class of utility functions, the central
bank’s efforts to eliminate overpricing in the market will always harm the buyer more
by increasing the price in states of the world where the central bank does not announce,
than help him by preventing him from buying an asset that is known to be overpriced.
This result has profound implications for the current debate over how central
banks should treat asset market bubbles. Namely, it is the first paper to examine this
particular unintended consequence the buyers experience. Not only does it suggest that
central banks cannot help protect buyers by deflating overpriced assets (or, at least, it
harms them on average by doing so), it suggests that even if the central bank knew with
certainty that assets were overpriced, it still could not improve the outcome for buyers
of the asset. Since such a perfect condition is unlikely to ever hold in the real world, we
can definitively say that central bank policy should not be used to protect buyers in
asset markets from unscrupulous sellers, or from ups and downs in asset market prices.

4

CHAPTER 2
INSIDER TRADING AND THE 2008 STOCK MARKET CRASH
2.1

Introduction

The ability of insiders to forecast future price movements in their own stocks is well
documented. A vast literature has been devoted to uncovering the extent to which
inside traders can predict future returns [See Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Finnerty
(1976), Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), Jaffe (1974), Chowdhury et al. (1993), and
Seyhun (1986) for examples]. The current paper adds to this body of work by
examining insider trading during the October 2008 stock market crash. This particular
time period is interesting because of the extreme movements in the stock market
aggregates at the time,1 and the obviously pertinent information flows that come along
with widespread market crashes. We have only one other similar period in recent US
stock market history, namely the October 19, 1987 “Black Monday” stock market crash.
That crash is documented in detail by Seyhun (1990, 1999). Along with the 1987 crash,
the 2008 stock market crash presents an excellent opportunity to study how insiders
trade before, during and after a widespread, traumatic market event, and whether the
market processes information differently during such periods.
1

For instance, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by nearly 20% the week of October 6-10, the
worst single week in its history. Similar declines were experienced at the same time by the NASDAQ
composite, S&P, Nikkei, Hang Seng, and FTSE indices.
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Specifically, I address two questions. First, I test whether or not inside traders in
firms that performed especially poorly during the crash predicted the crash by selling
their own stocks before the crash. Any evidence of pre-crash selling would imply that
insiders had some sort of ability to foresee the crash. Given that previous studies
establish insiders’ ability to predict future movements in their own stocks, it may have
been possible for them to see the 2008 crash coming. Secondly, one of the many
interesting results from Seyhun (1990, 1999) is that insiders bought in very large
numbers immediately after the 1987 crash. I follow Seyhun by examining whether or
not insiders bought in large numbers after the 2008 crash. Additionally, I also examine
the post-crash returns to stocks sorted on the basis of insider trading, as in Seyhun
(1990), to determine the extent to which these buyers could predict which stocks would
recover most rapidly after the crash.
While the prior literature is unambiguous in showing that inside traders can
forecast future stock returns, most of these returns are small enough to be wiped out by
transactions and/or research costs (Rozeff and Zaman, 1988), and thus the persistent
existence of these returns is not thought to conflict with the weak or semi-weak forms of
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1965, 1970).
Curiously, the returns reported by Seyhun (1990) after the 1987 stock market
crash are a great deal larger than most of the returns documented in the prior literature
on this topic. To quote Seyhun (1990), p. 1386, ”...the difference in the 14-month
post-crash returns between [the most heavily bought and most heavily sold stocks]
reaches 18.5%. ...This difference substantially exceeds the previously reported stock
price movements following insiders’ transactions.” Even the most optimistic of the other
6

papers generally report no more than 6-8% abnormal returns over the next year for
stocks that are bought heavily by insiders. However studies on insider trading and
future stock returns are exclusively conducted using data during normal (non-crash)
trading periods, whereas Seyhun studies a period with a major market crash. Given this
discrepancy, the evidence for the 1987 crash, presented by Seyhun (1990, 1999), begs for
a follow up study on returns to stocks purchased by insiders after market crashes.
Widespread market crashes don’t happen that often, and thus the data generated by
these events is exceedingly rare. At this point, the crashes of 1987 and 2008 are the only
two major U.S. stock market crashes for which data on insider trading is readily
available.
I show that, like the 1987 crash, inside traders did not forecast the stock market
crash of 2008 at either long or short horizons by selling early. Not only did they seem
not to predict the crash in the aggregate, they also did not predict whether their own
individual stocks would do better or worse during the crash, and an outside observer
could not have profited by selling the same securities that insiders sold heavily before
the crash. Also like the 1987 crash, I show that there was a large burst of insider buying
as soon as the crash began, that lasted through the end of 2008. The stocks that were
most heavily bought by insiders during that period earned substantial abnormal returns
over the next 14 months after the crash. These returns were similar in magnitude to
those reported by Seyhun (1990). An outside observer mimicking the behavior of the
heaviest of insider buyers could have earned abnormal returns of 26-32%. In addition
these returns were very long-lasting, being well spread out over the next 14 months.
These returns continued to be large well into the second and third quarters of 2009,
7

about the same time the stock market began recovering.
The primary results in this paper strongly support the observations made by
Seyhun (1990) about the 1987 crash: insiders appear not to predict the crash ahead of
time, but buy in large numbers afterwards, and insiders are able to take advantage of
the market by picking winners as a group. Once again, the returns generated post-crash
are significantly larger than even the most optimistic prior literature report on insider
trading during normal market periods (See Seyhun (1986), Chowdhury, et al. (1993),
and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). Since Seyhun (1990) studies the only other market
crash for which we have adequate data, his work together with the current paper,
suggests that returns to mimicking insider movements after market crashes are larger
than during normal periods.
The fact that the returns are large and long lasting may seem to be a major
violation of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH). However, because market crashes
are such exceedingly rare events, investors likely do not yet know how strongly to react
to insider signals during major stock market crashes.
Finally, as in the previous literature (Lakonishok and Lee (2001)), I find insiders
were more likely to purchase their own stock if their firms were small firms, and high
book-to-market firms. I additionally show that insiders also tended to favor high-beta
stocks. Each of these behavioral patterns should imply that portfolios sorted by the
intensity of insider purchases should earn higher returns due to the size effect (Banz
(1981)), value effect (Fama and French (1992)), and high beta. The abnormal returns
generated by portfolios sorted by insider trading patterns, however, continue to be
present after inclusion of these factors as control variables.
8

2.1.1

Literature Review

The prior insider trading literature primarily asks whether insider trades can predict
future returns during normal trading periods (Again, see Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986),
and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for examples). If insiders can generate significant
returns, then it is possible that outsiders mimicking the actions of insiders can
potentially profit from the information on insider trades, and thus the existence of
persistently large abnormal returns represents evidence against the EMH. The extant
literature generally concludes that insiders possess superior information, and are able to
profit from this information (Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), and
Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). Table 2.1 summarizes some of the more highly cited
examples in this particular field, in chronological order, along with the predicted returns
to portfolios built around insider trading patterns.2

2

In general, the calculation and methods of estimation of these returns vary between studies, but
for the most part, they can all be interpreted as abnormal market returns generated by constructing a
portfolio based on some measure of insider trading. The measure of insider trading, the holding period
length, and the degree of insider trading included in each portfolio varies from study to study. These
differences are noted in the table where necessary. With the exception of Seyhun (1990), however, these
studies arrive at the same qualitative conclusions.

9
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Summary of some of the related literature on the topic. These are a few of the most highly cited empirical studies that examine the predictive power of insider trading. The table is
not intended to be a detailed list of all of the papers that study insider trading.
Study
Sample used in study
Size of returns after inNotes
sider trades
Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968)
Stratified random sample of Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) shows that insider
NYSE stocks, 1960-1970
trades can forecast price changes of 8% or more within
six months, but provides no evidence on how large the
returns are.
Jaffe (1974)
Large cap CRSP stocks from
1%-7.4% over 8 months
1962-68
Finnerty (1976)
All NYSE stocks, 1969-1972
8.3% for buys over 11
The returns reported to the left probably overstate
months, -4.8% for sales Finnerty’s results somewhat. Finnerty calculates his
returns for each month after the trading event. The
numbers to the left are simply the sums of all the
monthly returns estimated by Finnerty. The results
are presented this way to remain consistent with the
existing literature that cites it (Seyhun (1986)). Returns for stocks are strongest one month after the insider trading event, but dissipate quickly, mostly disappearing by the third month. Returns after month
five are generally very imprecisely estimated with pvalues near or above 0.1.
Seyhun (1986)
Stratified random sample of 3.1%-4.3% for buys, - Seyhun (1986) also shows that most of the abnormal
NYSE and AMEX stocks,
2.2% for sales over ap- returns occur within the first 100 days after an insider
1975-1981
proximately 10 months
trading event, similar to Finnerty (1976).
Rozeff and Zaman (1988)
All NYSE stocks, 1973-1982
∼ 6% over 12 months,
3-3.5% with transactions costs included.
Seyhun (1990)
All NYSE, NASDAQ, and 10.1%-18.5%
adAMEX stocks 1987-88 in ditional
returns
response to the October
over 14 months for
1987 stock market crash.
stocks bought after
the crash compared
to stocks with no
inside trading.
Continued on next page

Table 2.1: Summary of Some Highly Cited Insider Trading Papers
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Lakonishok and Lee (2001)

Chowdhury, Howe, and Lin (1993)

Study

Table 2.1 – Continued from previous page
Sample used in study
Size of returns after in- Notes
sider trades
All NYSE and AMEX stocks, 0%-3% for buys, 0% for Predicted returns are very small and disappear after
1975-1986
sales over 5 months
the first week of trading after an unexpected increase
in insider purchases. Nearly no effect is detected for
sales.
All NYSE, NASDAQ, and
∼ 0%-7.2% for buys, - L&L (2001) generally shows returns of about 3.5% for
purchases for all firms and under 2% for sales, but the
AMEX stocks, 1975-1995
3.7%-0% for sales over
returns are more extreme for small firms.
the next 12 months

From Table 2.1, two general conclusions from the literature are immediately
apparent. First, the informational content of purchases is well established and sales
seem to be less informative than buys. Constructing a portfolio based on insider
purchases is able to generate positive market returns, but sales generate smaller returns,
or even no returns at all.3 This general trend is documented by Finnerty (1976), Seyhun
(1986), Chowdhury, Lowe, and Lin (1993), and Lakonishok and Lee (2001).
Secondly, the returns to mimicking inside traders are usually so small that they
are likely either severely reduced or completely eliminated by transactions and research
costs, hence the persistent existence of these returns need not necessarily conflict with
the EMH (Rozeff and Zaman (1988)). In general, the returns for the next 12 months
after the insider trading event do not exceed 8%, with the bulk of those returns coming
within the first few months after the insider trading event.4
The big outlier in Table 2.1 however is Seyhun’s (1990) study of the 1987 stock
market crash. Seyhun finds much larger and more economically significant returns to
portfolios built on insider trading behavior in the year following the 1987 stock market
crash.5 Seyhun finds that portfolios built around insider purchases post-crash did far
better than the portfolio of stocks that had no insider trading at all, accumulating
between 10-17% higher returns. This figure is higher than even the most optimistic
3

Marin and Olivier (2008) find that insider sales can predict large downward stock movements on the
individual level, but only at long lag lengths.
4
A potential exception, not listed here, is Cohen, et al. (2012), who find returns between 10% and
20% for portfolios based of “opportunistic” inside traders after screening out “routine” inside trades.
However since previous studies do not attempt to screen out these routine trades, the Cohen, et al.
study is not directly comparable to the studies included in Table 2.1.
5
Seyhun (1999) also looks at the 1987 crash. However, that study is largely just a restatement of the
findings in Seyhun (1990) and consequently is not listed here.
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studies on normal trading period returns, which generally found no more than 8%
abnormal returns over the year following portfolio construction.
The disparity between Seyhun’s results and the rest of the literature raises
several questions. Do Seyhun’s results simply reflect statistical noise? Is this a pattern
that is common to market crashes? If so, what makes market crashes different, and why
did investors not arbitrage these gains away?
I demonstrate in this paper that Seyhun’s results were not a statistical fluke. As
in 1987, inside traders were able to pick big winners after the 2008 crash, and revealed
their information by buying winners in large numbers. Thus, not only were Seyhun’s
results not a fluke, they seem to be part of a pattern of large post-crash returns to
insider trading portfolios.
While the returns to post-crash insider trading portfolios are quite large, these
results probably do not violate the EMH. Because crashes are so rare, investors could
not have had much knowledge about how to interpret insider trades during the market
crash. The US stock market has had only two such crashes for which we have sufficient
data to study: 1987 and 2008. Thus, the average US investor after the 2008 crash has
likely experienced only one major market crash during his career. We should therefore
not be surprised to find that these investors do not know how to interpret the
informational content of trades by insiders before, during, and after a market crash, so
the subsequent returns signaled by those trades should behave very differently from
insider trades during ordinary times.
Seyhun’s other principal finding is that insiders did not predict the 1987 crash
13

ahead of time by selling early.6 The lack of early selling by insiders recalls much of the
literature which finds that sales have less informational content than buys. This also
presents a hypothesis that can be applied to the 2008 crash, allowing us to further test
if these market crashes are similar to each other.

2.2

Insiders

In the United States, an insider in any particular company is defined by the SEC act of
1934 as a senior officer, a person on the board of directors, or a holder of 10% or more
of the company’s outstanding shares. A central feature of insider regulation is
disclosure. Insiders are required to report to the SEC their trades of stock issued by the
company they are considered insiders for. Whenever an insider trades their stock, she or
he must file a “Form 4” with the SEC, which details the time and date of the trade,
whether it was a purchase or a sale, the number of shares traded, and the price of those
shares. As soon as they are filed, these forms are made available to the public by the
SEC. Prior to 2002, insiders were required to file a Form 4 with the SEC within 10 days
after any change in ownership. However in 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act shortened the
reporting time to within two business days. Additionally, insiders are not allowed to
short-sell their own stock and most companies prohibit or strongly discourage their
insiders from trading around major company events such as earnings or dividends
announcements. Lastly, short-swing profits from trades made by an insider reversing his
or her position within six months are recoverable by either the corporation or the SEC.
6

Marin and Olivier (2008) anecdotally show a curious increase in insider selling approximately 10
months before the 1987 crash. However their study does not examine the 1987 crash in detail. In light
of the findings in Seyhun (1990) and this paper, their anecdote is likely mere happenstance, though their
major finding that insiders can successfully predict individual stock crashes remains important.
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This effectively prohibits insiders from reversing their positions within six months. This
restriction likely causes insiders to be much more thoughtful and deliberate about their
actions. Since any position cannot be reversed for six months, the informed insider must
be sure of his trades and potentially must be able to accurately predict events that may
be far off in the future.

2.3

Data and Methodology

Insider trading data are made public by the SEC’s Ownership Reporting System (ORS),
which is now a part of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval
(EDGAR) system. Insider trades are then relayed by other media platforms to the
general public. Insider trading data for this paper is collected from the reporting site
SECform4.com. Among the data reported on Form 4 are: the date and time of the
trade, the date on which the trade was reported,7 whether the trade was a buy or sell,
the size of the trade, the current price of the stock, the identity of the insider, and
his/her current holdings of the company’s stock. The sample consists of US exchange
traded common stock. The sample period for inside trades runs from the week starting
January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008. Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for
the insider trading sample.
The sample contains a total of 163,795 insider transactions over the period, from
7,073 firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges. The first line in Table 2.2

7

As mentioned above, insiders may report their trades at any point within two days after the trade
is executed.
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Sample statistics for insider trading during the period 1/1/2007 - 12/31/2008. The top line presents the statistics on the average purchases,
sales, and transactions per month with a month defined as 22 trading days, as well as the average buy ratio for the entire period, and the
total number of firms who had insider trades during this period. The next four lines are sub-samples. First, the pre-crash period designated
as January, 2007 through August, 2008. September, 2008 is shown alone to see if insiders in the aggregate increased their selling behavior
significantly just before the crash. The crash period is designated as between the dates 10/2/2008 and 10/10/2008. The post-crash period
starts at the end of the crash period and continues through the end of 2008.
Subsample
Purchases (per month) Sales (per month) Transactions (per month) Buy Ratio Firms
Total (1/1/2007 - 12/31/2009)
2,489.0
4,335.8
6,824.8
0.36
7,073
Pre-Crash (1/1/2007 - 8/30/2008)
2,291.0
4,619.9
6,910.9
0.33
6,784
Sept 2008 (Month before the crash)
2,097.0
3,139.0
5,236.0
0.40
1,801
Crash Period (10/2/2008 - 10/10/2008)
2665.1
1,474.0
4,139.1
0.64
624
Post-Crash (10/13/2008 - 12/31/2008)
4,556.2
2,615.9
7,172.1
0.63
2,768

Table 2.2: Summary Insider Transaction Statistics, Pre- and Post-Crash

shows statistics on insider trading (per month) for the entire sample period. The next
two lines show the descriptive statistics in the pre-crash period separated into two
subperiods. The second line presents the data from the beginning of 2007 to August
2008, and the third line shows the only the month of September (the month leading up
to the crash). The fourth line reports the figures for the crash period, defined as
October 2 through Oct. 10, 2008. The final line shows insider trades after the crash
through the end of 2008. Before the crash, insider sales consistently outnumber buys
about 2 to 1, but selling lightly decelerates in September to a ratio of about about 3 to
2. In the post-crash period, the ratio reverses completely with buys now outnumbering
sales. After October 10, purchases vastly outnumber sales through the end of the year.
To test whether or not insiders could predict the crash, and whether they were
able to earn abnormal profits after the crash, returns were collected from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) over two horizons. Any firms with missing
information in the CRSP database were dropped from the sample. First, daily returns
from October 2 through Oct. 10, 2008 were used to calculate holding period returns for
the crash itself. These returns are matched by firm with insider trades in the pre-crash
period to assess insiders’ ability to predict the crash. To test whether insiders were able
to predict returns after the crisis, I collect monthly returns for the next year from Jan.
2009, to Dec. 2009, and match those returns by firm with insider trades in the
post-crash period.
Returns for both the crash and post-crash subperiods are risk-adjusted using the
typical CAPM and Fama-French (FF) regressions shown in Equations (2.1) and (2.2):

17

reti,t − rft = αi,t + βi (mktt − rft )

reti,t − rft = αi,t,F F + (βM )i (mktt − rft ) + (βH )i HM Lt + (βS )i SM Bt

(2.1)

(2.2)

Here, reti is the raw return for stock i, rf is the (risk-free) rate of return on a 1-month
U.S. treasury bill, and αi,t and αi,t,F F are the abnormal returns (hereafter the “alphas”)
for each stock. The independent variables are the factors for the different specifications.
The CAPM model only adjusts for exposure to the market excess. mktt is the
value-weighted market return in month t. The FF model also includes the
book-to-market factor, HM L (high-minus-low ), and the size factor, SM B
(small-minus-big). Factor data are obtained from the Fama French factor database
provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
Using the above regressions, I estimate the beta coefficients for each stock in the
sample using both the CAPM and Fama-French specifications. Equations (2.1) and
(2.2) are estimated using 60 months of past data (Jan. 2002-Dec. 2006) to avoid any
overlap with the pre-crash portfolio formation period. The betas from this estimation
are saved, and then used to adjust the returns in the relevant sample periods. The risk
adjustment is performed by subtracting from the raw return, each of the factors
multiplied by the corresponding betas to obtain the alpha for each stock. As a
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robustness check, I also consider the raw returns to each stock adjusted by subtracting
the value weighted NYSE/Nasdaq/AMEX index return.
Lastly, to test whether the behavior of returns is sensitive to firm size and
book-to-market (B/M) value in the post-crash period, market capitalization and B/M
data are taken from Compustat. Book value (per share) is calculated as the total value
of assets minus the total value of liabilities divided by the number of common shares
outstanding. B/M is simply the book value per share divided by the market price.
As is common in cross-sectional studies (see: Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and
Conrad and Kaul (1993)) I drop all stocks with a price of less than $1 at the end of
December, 2008.8 I also drop all stocks with any missing information from the CRSP
tapes or from Compustat. The final sample size for the post-crash period is 1,352 firms.

2.3.1

Insider Trading Metrics for Individual Stocks

I first define the Net Insider Purchases of insider trading,

N IPi = numbuysi − numsellsi

N IPi can be thought of as an insider trading differential for each firm. A positive N IPi
indicates that the stock was a net buy for insiders (the stock was bought more than it
was sold), and a negative N IPi indicates a net sell for insiders. The larger (smaller) the
8

There were fewer than 10 firms in the sample that were highly insolvent (Liabilities > Assets) at the
end of December, 2008. Accordingly, these firms also had very low stock prices, which means a small
number of firms in the sample have very large negative B/M figures. Though these firms were small in
number, they had B/M values sufficiently large negative enough to cause the mean of B/M to become
negative. The problem is solved by simply eliminating these stocks from the sample. This does not cause
any of the primary results in this paper to change greatly.
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N IPi , the more that stock was bought (sold) by insiders. Once each stock is assigned
an N IP , the stocks are then partitioned into quartiles. Q1 is designated the “high sell”
portfolio. It contains the stocks that were most sold during the portfolio formation
period (so they have the smallest, i.e. the biggest negative, N IPi ’s). Conversely, the
“high buy” portfolio is Q4. It contains the stocks that were most bought (have the
biggest positive N IPi ’s).
N IP is a basic measure of insider trading intensity, but in some cases, it may
not be completely informative. For instance, if a stock has an N IP of 20, it could have
20 buys and no sales, or conversely, it could have 120 buys and 100 sells. In the first
case, the insider trades are exclusively buys. In the second, there are only 20% more
buys than sells. However, the N IP measure will give these two outcomes the same
weight in any analysis. For this reason, I also calculate the Net Insider Purchase Ratio
as in Seyhun (1990) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001), defined as

N IP Ri =

numbuysi − numsellsi
numbuysi + numsellsi

This measure gives the appropriate weight in terms of the ratio by which buys
exceed sales, and vice-versa. Once again a positive value indicates a stock was a net
insider buyer, and a negative value means it was a net inisder seller. The ratio, however,
also has a potential drawback. A ratio measure would assign the same value to a firm
with one insider trade that was a buy during the portfolio formation period as a firm
that had 20 insider trades that were all buys. The previous measure, N IP , therefore
remains useful to distinguish between these cases.
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Finally, counting transactions may be problematic because a given transaction
could be large or small. The two metrics described above treat all transactions the
same, regardless of how large the transaction is. Therefore, I also define share-weighted
values for the insider trading metrics. The Net Insider Share Purchase Ratio is the
share-weighted analogue to N IP Ri :

N ISP Ri =

(sharesbought)i − (sharessold)i
(sharesbought)i + (sharessold)i

Summary statistics for the insider trading variables and other selected variables
appear in Table 2.3 separated by the two different subperiods that this paper studies.
The pre-crash period is defined from Oct. 1, 2007 to Sept. 30, 2008, and the post-crash
period is defined as Oct. 13, 2008 to Dec. 31, 2008.

2.3.2

Aggregate Insider Trading

Marin and Olivier (2008) provides evidence that insiders can predict crashes in their
own individual stocks during normal trading periods, but only for very long lead times.9
It is important to stress that their results apply for normal trading periods for
individual stocks that experience a crash. During a period with many stocks crashing at
once, it is conceivable that the information signaled by insiders is very different than
during normal trading periods. In this subsection, I examine how aggregate insider
trading patterns changed around the crash.

9

Marin and Olivier (2008) also presents some anecdotal evidence of a noticeable increase in insider
selling approximately ten months before the 1987 stock market crash. See Footnote 7.
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Table 2.3: Cross-sectional Stock Summary Statistics
Selected summary statistics for stocks during the pre-crash period (Oct. 1, 2007 - Sept. 30, 2008)
post-crash period (Oct. 13, 2008 - Dec. 31, 2008). All statistics are presented cross-sectionally among
firms in the sample. The collection period for the insider trading variables is Oct. 13, 2008 to Dec. 31,
2008. Size and B/M data are the values for each stock at the end of Dec., 2008. Since they are not
used for the pre-crash analysis, they are omitted in Panel A. The betas were estimated for each stock
from equations (2.1) and (2.2) using monthly data from the period Jan. 1, 2002 to Dec. 31, 2006. The
insider trading metrics are listed at the bottom of each panel. In order, they are the Net Insider
Purchases (N IP ), Net Insider Purchase Ratio (N IP R), and Net Insider Share Purchase Ratio
(N ISP R).
Variable
Mean St. Dev.
Min
Max
Panel A - Pre-crash data: Oct. 1, 2007- Sept. 30, 2008
β (CAPM)
1.143
0.873
-4.042
8.428
βM (FF)
1.007
0.901
-11.680 7.500
βH
0.190
1.303
-9.180 10.390
βS
0.679
1.159
-8.560 12.910
N IP
-3.500
49.500
-579
2638
N IP R
-0.053
0.845
-1.00
1.00
N ISP R
-0.117
0.891
-1.00
1.00
Panel B - Post-crash data: Oct. 13, 2008 - Dec. 31, 2008
Size (billions of $)
2.474
11.86
0.0007 218.91
B/M
0.394
0.573
-3.48
5.590
β (CAPM)
1.287
0.655
-1.276
3.981
βM (FF)
1.156
0.683
-1.568
6.576
βH
-0.106
1.347
-7.511
7.359
βS
0.722
1.347
-14.04
7.864
N IP
0.820
7.277
-58
84
N IP R
0.131
0.915
-1.00
1.00
N ISP R
0.097
0.950
-1.00
1.00

As in Seyhun (1999), define the aggregate proportion of insider buys as:

Pnt

BU Yj,t
Pnt
j=1 BU Yj,t +
j=1 SALEj,t

BuyP roportiont = Pnt

j=1

(2.3)

where j represents transaction j during week t. The ratio represents the proportion of
insider transactions in any particular week that are buys. This measure is an aggregate
measure of transaction level insider trading, similar to N IP R in Section 2.3.1. However
it measures insider buys as a percentage of total transactions for all stocks in each week.
Figure 2.1 plots the results from computing the transaction proportion on a weekly
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basis for the two years from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2008. The vertical lines
denote the crash (Oct. 2 - Oct. 7).
Figure 2.1: Proportion of insider transactions that are buys. Vertical Lines denote
dates of the stock market crash.

Unlike the 1987 crash, where there was a significant sell-off by insiders around
10-months before the crash (Marin and Olivier 2008), there is not an obvious sign of an
abnormally large dip in the insider buying ratio at any point in the two years prior to
the crash. In general, the buy-ratio begins at a low level in early 2007, and remains low
through most of 2008.
What is immediately noticeable in Figure 2.1 is the extremely large increase in
the buy ratio immediately during the week of the crash. Taking the mean value of the
simple insider transaction proportion for the five weeks leading up to the crash (0.40)
and the five weeks after (0.63), the difference of 23% is economically significant, and
statistically significant with a p-value < .001. It’s worth noting that this jump is not
the only significant jump in aggregate insider trading during the sample. For instance,
measuring peak-to-peak, there appears to be a large shift upwards in the trading metric
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in July, 2007. The jump in late 2007 is probably inconsequential for the crash however,
since we still get a large peak-to-peak increase at the exact time the crash occurs, and
insiders do not shift from being net sellers to net buyers. No noticeable sell off,
comparing trough-to-trough, appears at any point in 2008, or in the months leading up
to the crash, as compared to what occurred in 1987 (Marin and Olivier (2008)). For a
more detailed test of whether insiders predicted the crash, I next construct a test
similar to that of Marin and Olivier (2008) to see if insiders individually predicted
abnormally large crashes in their own stocks at both long and short horizons.

2.4

2.4.1

Analysis and Results

Were insiders able to predict the crash?

From the data in Section 2.3.3, it appears that insiders (in the aggregate) did not signal
the crash with any noticeable increase in selling before the crash. However, it is still
possible that they predicted a crash in their individual stocks by selling off the biggest
losers before the crash. To further examine this hypothesis, I employ a statistical test
similar to the one used in Marin and Olivier (2008) to identify whether insiders could
predict crashes in their stock far in advance of the crash itself.
I calculate N IP , N IP R, and N ISP R for each firm for two portfolio formation
periods: first for the month of September (one full month before the crash), and then
for the months from October 2007 to August 2008 (the period between the 12th and
2nd months before the crash).10 I then match each stock with its risk adjusted
10

These portfolio formation periods are parallel to the ones used by Marin and Olivier (2008) so this
paper approximately tests the same hypothesis: that insider sales predicted the 2008 crash.
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abnormal holding return during the crash, i.e., from Thursday, Oct. 2 through Friday,
Oct. 10. Any stocks that were not matched due to missing returns or reporting errors
were eliminated from the data.
Table 2.4 presents the abnormal returns (alphas) along with the Market
Adjusted returns for portfolios organized using each of the three insider trading metrics
presented in the previous section. For the N IP measure the stocks are sorted into
quartile portfolios, and the results are presented in Panel A. For the N IP R and
N ISP R measures, the quartile approach is insufficient because there are many stocks
that had only buys or only sells during the portfolio formation period, so I sort the
stocks according to the value of N IP R and N ISP R. The top portfolio in Panels B and
C in Table 2.4 correspond to stocks who had no buys (only sells) during the portfolio
formation period (or N IP R = N ISP R = −1). The next portfolio includes stocks with
more sells than buys (N IP R, N ISP R ∈ (−1, 0]). The third portfolio includes stocks
with more buys than sells (N IP R, N ISP R ∈ (0, 1)). Finally the last portfolio includes
stocks who had no sells (only buys) during the portfolio formation period. Because
Sept, 2008 is such a short time period, less than 50 stocks had a mixture of buys and
sales during the portfolio formation period, so results are only shown for the “only sell”
and “only buy” portfolios. Abnormal returns were calculated using the CAPM, and the
Fama-French three-factor methods as in Fama and French (1993). I also include the raw
returns for each portfolio minus the value-weighted NYSE/Nasdaq/AMEX market
return for comparison under the column labled “Market Adjusted”.
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Abnormal returns during the 2008 stock market crash based on a holding period from Oct. 2 to Oct. 10, 2008 (t-statistics in parentheses). The portfolios are formed on the basis of
insider trading activity calculated by each stock’s Net Insider Purchases (N IP ), Net Insider Purchase Ratio (N IP R), andN etInsiderShareP urchaseRatio(NISPR) during the portfolio
formation period. The portfolio formation periods are parallel to those used by Marin and Olivier (2008), Oct. 2007 - Aug. 2008 is the period twelve to two months before the crash.
Sept. 2008 is the month immediately preceding the crash. Abnormal returns are reported for both the CAPM and FF 3-factor specifications. “Market Adjusted” returns are the
portfolio raw returns minus the value-weighted NYSE/Nasdaq/AMEX return and are included for comparison and robustness. Panel A presents the results by sorting stocks into
quartiles according to the Net Insider Purchases (NIP) measure of insider trading. Panel B presents the results using the Net Insider Purchase Ratio, and panel C presents the results
for the Net Insider Share Purchase Ratio sorted into portfolios according to the criteria in the first column.
Oct. 2007 - Aug. 2008 Portfolios
Sept. 2008 Portfolios
Portfolio
Market Adjusted
CAPM alpha
FF 3-factor alpha
Market Adjusted
CAPM alpha FF 3-factor alpha
Panel A - NIP
Quartile 1
-0.0068**
0.0664***
0.0074
0.0064
0.0207
-0.0004
(Most sold)
(-2.06)
(9.09)
(1.01)
(0.80)
(1.80)
(-0.02)
Quartile 2
-0.0003
0.0474***
0.0002
0.0095
0.0402**
-0.0304*
(-0.06)
(4.78)
(0.02)
(1.00)
(2.26)
(-1.89)
Quartile 3
-0.0068
0.0096
-0.0219**
-0.0026
0.0043
-0.0217
(-1.51)
(1.15)
(-2.41)
(0.22)
(0.23)
(-1.02)
Quartile 4
-0.0030
0.0209**
-0.0060
0.0031
0.0509**
0.0163
(Most bought)
(-0.55)
(2.11)
(-0.61)
(1.23)
(2.63)
(0.82)
Panel B - NIPR
Only sells
0.0002
0.0667***
-0.0011
0.0031
0.0272***
-0.0106
(0.05)
(7.74)
(-0.13)
(0.50)
(2.62)
(-1.28)
N IP R ∈ (−1, 0]
-0.0007
0.0488***
0.0091
(-0.18)
(6.01)
(1.02)
N IP R ∈ (0, 1)
-0.0009
0.0245**
0.0107
(-0.16)
(2.53)
(0.97)
Only buys
-0.0133***
0.0013
-0.0329***
-0.0024
0.0219
-0.0069
(-2.97)
(0.14)
(-3.64)
(-0.25)
(1.54)
(-0.47)
Panel C - NISPR
Only sells
0.0002
0.0667***
-0.0011
0.0031
0.0272***
-0.0106
(0.05)
(7.74)
(-0.13)
(0.50)
(2.62)
(-1.28)
N ISP R ∈ (−1, 0]
0.0025
0.0376***
0.0059
(0.64)
(5.02)
(0.72)
N ISP R ∈ (0, 1)
-0.0067
0.0427***
0.0166
(-1.09)
(3.85)
(1.28)
Only buys
-0.0133***
0.0013
-0.0329***
-0.0024
0.0219
-0.0069
(-2.97)
(0.14)
(-3.64)
(-0.25)
(1.54) ‘
(-0.47)

Table 2.4: Prediction of Crash Returns

As can be seen from the Table 2.4, no significant patterns emerge based on
insider trading from either time period. Most importantly, quartiles 1 and 2 do not
display any consistently negative abnormal returns, indicating that insiders are not
forecasting losers. If anything the results seem to show some weak evidence of negative
prediciton, that is the most sold stocks are doing better than the most bought ones.
This primarily appears in the CAPM results for the long-horizon (Oct. 2007-Aug. 2008)
subperiod where the returns to the portfolio of most sold stocks is larger than the
returns to the portfolio of most bought stocks. It also appears weakly in the
long-horizon Market Adjusted returns and the 3-factor alphas. These results are not
robust to all measures of insider trading, even for the Oct. 2007-Dec. 2008 subperiod.
They’re also economically small, being between 1 and 6%.
The CAPM results for the short-horizon in Panel A provide some very weak
evidence for prediction. The high-buy quartile does about 3% better than the low-buy
portfolio. This result however is not robust to the 3-factor returns, nor does it appear
for either of the other metrics in Panels B and C. Overall, these results combined with
that in Section 2.3.3 suggest we can soundly reject the hypothesis that insiders
predicted the stock by selling early. This is consistent with the results from Seyhun
(1990) who also did not observe appreciable early insider selling before the 1987 crash,
nor does he observe any evidence of insiders predicting the crash individually.
It is important to stress that, while this paper tests approximately the same
hypothesis as Marin and Olivier (2008) these results do not invalidate or contradict
those presented in Marin and Olivier (2008). Table 2.4 above simply shows that their
results do not apply to this period where many stocks crashed at the same time. One
27

obvious explanation is that insiders simply may not have been able to predict the crash
ahead of time. This could be the case if enough stocks with good fundamentals were
crashing just as badly as stocks with bad fundamentals, much in the same way that
both solvent and insolvent banks suffer during a bank run. A second possibility is that
insiders may have been aware that their firms would do especially poorly if the market
were to crash, but were unwilling to signal their pessimism to investors by selling. This
might have been the case if insiders were more concerned about the confidence of
outside investors in their firms than value of their own stock portfolios.

2.4.2

Post-Crash Predictions

The ability of insiders to predict returns is well documented in the literature. However
as mentioned above, most of the classic studies on insider trading show that these gains,
while statistically significant, are small in magnitude, and almost completely exhausted
within a couple of months (Finnerty 1976, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Chowhdury et al.
1993). Whether or not prices display this pattern after a major stock market crash is
another question, and one that has little empirical documentation. I examine this
question by forming portfolios based on the N IP , N IP R, and N ISP R of insider
trading for the period immediately following the crash. This portfolio formation period
runs from Oct. 13 to Dec. 31, 2008. I then match each stock’s N IP , N IP R, and
N ISP R with it’s monthly abnormal returns from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 2009. The
portfolio’s abnormal return is defined as the equally-weighted average of the abnormal
returns for each stock over the holding period.11 As in Section 2.4.1, stocks are divided
11

Seyhun (1990) forms his insider portfolios by measuring the change in the net purchase ratio (purchases divided by transactions) during the week of the 1987 crash. Therefore, he defines insider trading
to be the degree to which insiders reversed their positions during the crash. This method captures
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into approximately equally sized quartile portfolios based on N IP . I also form
portfolios based on N IP R, and N ISP R. For each of these measure, I divide the stocks
into four portfolios based on the ratio: A high-sell portfolio where N IP R or
N ISP R = −1 (all sales), a sell portfolio where N IP R or N ISP R ∈ (−1, 0] (more sales
than buys), a buy portfolio where N IP R or N ISP R ∈ (0, 1) (more buys than sales),
and a high-buy portfolio, where N IP R or N ISP R = 1 (all buys).
The results are presented in Table 2.5 for both CAPM and Fama-French 3-factor
treatments. Panels A, B, and C present the returns for N IP , N IP R, and N ISP R
portfolios respectively. The Market Adjusted returns (raw returns minus total
value-weighted market return) are again presented side-by-side for comparison and
robustness only.
What’s striking in Table 2.5 is how large the abnormal returns are to the
high-buy portfolios. The high-buy portfolio for all three measures show returns between
26% and 32% for 2009. The high-buy portfolio for all three measures show returns
between 26% and 32% for 2009. The difference between the high-buy and high-sell
portfolios range between 22.90% (3-factor alphas for N IP R and N ISP R) and 27.47%
(CAPM alphas for N IP ). These returns are slightly larger, but similar to those
reported by Seyhun

similar information, however the measures are different from the current paper. The current paper also
includes a longer portfolio formation period than Seyhun (1990). This is appropriate for this paper for
two reasons. First, the 2008 stock market crash occurred in the context of a much wider economic event:
the Subprime Mortgage Lending Crisis of (2007-2008). The market crash occurred in October, 2008,
but the market began to decline late in 2007, and continued to decline until well into 2009. Second, the
short swing rule (see section 2.2) may prevent an insider from trading within a short period of time even
if he wants to trade. Therefore, it makes sense to use a longer formation period for portfolios based on
insider trades after the crash. These differences, however, are not likely to seriously affect a qualitative
comparison of the two papers.
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Table 2.5: Prediction of Post-crash Returns - Jan. 2009 - Dec. 2009

Abnormal returns during the post-crash holding period from Jan. 1, 2009 to Dec. 31,
2009 (standard errors in parentheses). The portfolios are formed on the basis of insider
trading activity calculated by each stock’s Net Insider Purchases (N IP ), Net Insider
Purchase Ratio (N IP R), and Net Insider Share Purchase Ratio (N ISP R) during the
portfolio formation period from Oct. 13, 2008 to Dec. 31, 2008. Abnormal returns are
reported for both the CAPM and FF 3-factor specifications. “Market Adjusted” returns
are the portfolio raw returns minus the value-weighted NYSE/Nasdaq/AMEX return
and are included for comparison and robustness. Panel A presents the results by sorting
stocks into quartiles according to the Net Insider Purchases (NIP) measure of insider
trading. Panel B presents the results using the Net Insider Purchase Ratio, and panel C
presents the results for the Net Insider Share Purchase Ratio sorted according to the
criteria in the first column.
Portfolio
Panel A - NIP
Quartile 1
(Most sold)
Quartile 2
Quartile 3
Quartile 4
(Most bought)
Panel B - NIPR
Only sells
N IP R ∈ (−1, 0]
N IP R ∈ (0, 1)
Only buys
Panel C - NISPR
Only sells
N ISP R ∈ (−1, 0]
N ISP R ∈ (0, 1)
Only buys

Market Adjusted

CAPM alpha

FF 3-factor alpha

0.0759***
(2.51)
0.2073***
(7.24)
0.4502***
(2.89)
0.4885***
(9.07)

0.0488**
(1.97)
0.1368***
(5.67)
0.3455**
(2.36)
0.3235***
(7.74)

0.0235
(0.81)
0.1105***
(4.65)
0.3096**
(2.08)
0.2723***
(6.86)

0.0909***
(3.89)
0.1158***
(4.81)
0.3022***
(5.24)
0.4213***
(6.07)

0.0566***
(2.84)
0.0723***
(3.60)
0.1997***
(4.12)
0.3014***
(4.72)

0.0310
(1.53)
0.0486**
(2.24)
0.1698***
(3.46)
0.2600***
(4.02)

0.0909***
(3.89)
0.1241***
(5.08)
0.2541***
(4.74)
0.4213***
(6.07)

0.0566***
(2.84)
0.0798***
(3.92)
0.1566***
(3.47)
0.3014***
(4.72)

0.0310
(1.53)
0.0579***
(2.62)
0.1166***
(2.61)
0.2600***
(4.02)

(1990) for the 1987 crash (10-19%). The difference between the results in this paper and
Seyhun’s may simply reflect the timing of the 2008 crash, which occurred as part of a
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much larger financial event, or it may reflect the longer portfolio formation period, or
both. For comparison, Finnerty (1976) constructs portfolios of stocks weighted by how
heavily those stocks are bought by insiders during normal trading periods, and reports
only a 4% abnormal return in the first month for a portfolio of insider buys, 1% after
the second month, and mere basis points thereafter, completely disappearing by the
sixth month. Thus it seems that the advantage to following the heaviest of inside buyers
produces much larger returns after a crisis than is typical during normal trading periods.
Interestingly, the CAPM abnormal returns to the high-sell portfolios are positive.
However, this may not be surprising since insider sales do not tend to forecast future
negative returns very well (Lakonishok and Lee 2001, Chowdhury et al. 1993). They are
also not robust to the 3-factor adjustment which shows no significant returns above zero
for the high-sell porfolios.
The returns are all monotonically increasing in the insider trading measure,
except for the third and fourth quartile portfolios for the N IP measure, where the 3rd
quartile portfolio has a higher CAPM and 3-factor return than the 4th quartile portfolio.
However, the third quartile returns are well within the 95% confidence interval for the
fourth quartile returns for both the CAPM (.2415, .4056), and the 3-factor (.1944,
.3502) models, so we cannot say whether they are statistically different from each other.
The time series of monthly returns to the portfolios based on the N IP measure
is presented in Table 2.6. I include the abnormal CAPM and 3-factor return for each
month of 2009 for the high-buy and high-sell portfolios. I also report the difference
between them in the third column with t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Post-crash abnormal returns to insider stock portfolios
Monthly returns for quartile portfolios based on Net Insider Purchases (N IP ) for the portfolio formation period Oct. 13,
2008 to Jan. 2, 2009. Returns are presented for both the CAPM and FF 3-factor specifications. Q1 alpha is the abnormal
return to the portfolio of the top 25% of stocks most sold by insiders, while Q4 alpha is the abnormal return to the
portfolio of stocks most bought by insiders. Difference is the spread between the Q4 and Q1 abnormal returns.
***- Returns to Q4 are larger than returns to Q1 at the 1% significance level, **- at the 5% significance level, *- at the
10% significance level.

Jan 2009

Q1 alpha
(Most sold)
0.0037

CAPM alphas
Q4 alpha
(Most bought)
0.0994

Feb 09

-0.011

-0.0013

Mar 09

0.0135

0.0202

Apr 09

0.0524

0.1451

May 09

0.0032

0.0522

Jun 09

-0.0255

0.0194

Jul 09

0.0086

-0.0044

Aug 09

0.0160

0.0705

Sep 09

0.0194

0.0302

Oct 09

-0.0354

-0.0332

Nov 09

-0.0289

-0.0615

Dec 09

0.0353

0.0339

Month

Difference
0.0957***
(6.20)
0.0097
(0.87)
0.0067
(0.39)
0.0927***
(5.52)
0.0491***
(3.41)
-0.0061
(0.62)
-0.0130
(-1.22)
0.0545***
(2.96)
0.0108
(1.07)
0.0021
(0.27)
-0.032***
(-3.70)
-0.0019
(0.18)

Q1 alpha
(Most sold)
0.0054
-0.0190
0.0189
0.0258
0.0280
0.0084
-0.0009
0.0208
0.0069
-0.0077
-0.0035
-0.0013

FF 3-Factor alphas
Q4 alpha
Difference
(Most bought)
0.1195
0.1141***
(7.13)
0.0086
0.0272**
(2.33)
0.0194
0.0004
(0.02)
0.1098
0.0840***
(4.92)
0.0726
0.0446***
(3.08)
0.0097
0.0013
(-0.44)
-0.0224
-0.0215**
(-1.98)
0.0593
0.0385**
(2.00)
0.0165
0.0096
(0.93)
-0.0005
0.0072
(0.83)
-0.0400
-0.0364***
(-3.911)
-0.0001
0.0013
(-0.12)

The spread between the top and bottom portfolios, is listed under the column
labeled Difference. This captures the extent to which insiders were able to distinguish
between stocks which were going to rebound well, and those which were not.The
difference between the returns to the high-buy and high-sell portfolios behaves as
expected, with the largest returns occurring closest to the crash. However, the high-buy
portfolio continues to significantly outperform the high-sell portfolio well into the
second and third quarters of 2009, six months after the crash.
The spread between the top and bottom portfolios, is listed under the column
labeled Difference. This captures the extent to which insiders were able to distinguish
between stocks which were going to rebound well, and those which were not. The
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difference between the returns to the high-buy and high-sell portfolios behaves as
expected, with the largest returns occurring closest to the crash. However, the high-buy
portfolio continues to significantly outperform the high-sell portfolio well into the
second and third quarters of 2009, six months after the crash. This delayed response in
the returns is curious when compared with most of the literature, which finds that
insider trades lose their predictive power very quickly.12 The monthly returns for all
four quartiles are represented graphically in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, while the Q4-Q1 spread
appears in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
As we can again see, the high-buy portfolio exhibits large gains over the next
12-months, much larger than would be implied by even the most optimistic studies of
insider trading during normal periods (Finnerty 1976), and vastly more than
conservative estimates (Seyhun 1986, Chowdhury et al. 1993). The results do, again, by
and large, agree with Seyhun’s (1990) study of the 1987 crash, which found between
10.1% and 18.5% abnormal returns for a buy portfolio versus a sell portfolio. When
compared with the results from Seyhun (1990), it seems that the informational content
of inside trades after the 2008 stock market crash was similar to, or perhaps even
greater than for the 1987 stock market crash.

12

For instance, Finnerty (1976) reports almost no abnormal returns after the fourth month, Chowdhury
et al. (1993) reports most returns disappear after the first couple of weeks, and Seyhun (1986) shows
that most abnormal returns occur within the first 100 days after the insider trade. Seyhun (1990), which
studies the 1987 crash, has a very limited treatment of the length of the abnormal returns. He only
presents his results for a 14-month holding period from November 1987 to December 1988, and a 12month holding period which consists of January 1988 to December 1988 alone. The returns that exclude
the last two months in 1987 are significantly positive for his buy portfolios, but less so than the full 14
month sample.

33

Figure 2.2: Monthly CAPM abnormal returns to insider intensity portfolios
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Figure 2.3: Monthly FF abnormal returns to insider intensity portfolios
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Figure 2.4: The difference in CAPM returns between holding the high-buy (Q4)
portfolio over the high-sell portfolio (Q1) by month
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Figure 2.5: The difference in FF 3-factor returns between holding the high-buy (Q4)
portfolio over the high-sell portfolio (Q1) by monthh
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2.4.3

Which Insiders Are Trading Their Stocks After the Crash?

One curious observation from Table 2.5 is that the “market adjusted” raw returns are
quite a bit higher than either the CAPM or FF adjusted returns. Since overall stock
prices were rising very rapidly during this period, these high “market adjusted” raw
returns could be explained if insiders are trading predominantly in high-beta stocks. In
this case, the CAPM and FF models will more fully adjust for the unusually high
market returns, compared to the “market adjusted” returns, which de facto assume that
the beta for each stock in the sample is one. In fact, the average (CAPM) market beta
for the sample of post-crash insider traded stocks is 1.29. The average beta for the
high-sell (Q1) portfolio is 1.09, and the average beta for the
high-buy (Q4) portfolio is 1.50. Since the average beta for both portfolios is larger than
one, the CAPM-adjusted returns will be smaller than the “market adjusted” raw
returns in both portfolios. Since the average beta is higher for Q4 than for Q1, the
difference between the returns to Q4 and Q1 is also larger. This implies that insiders of
high-beta firms are more likely to buy than insiders of low-beta firms.
To further explore the behavior of inside traders, Table 2.7 presents the results
for the following regression:

Insiderbuyingi = δ0 + δ1 Sizei + δ2 (B/M )i + δ3 (βM )i + εi

(2.4)

The first line of Table 2.7 presents the results with Net Insider Purchase (N IP ) for
each stock on the left hand side. The next two use the Net Insider Purchase Ratio
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Table 2.7: Insider behavior

Regression results for equation (2.4). The dependent variable is the insider trading
metric. The independent variables are market capitalization (Size), the book-to-market
(B/M ) ratio, and each stock’s market beta ((βM )i ) as estimated from (2.2). The first
line shows the results with Net Insider Purchases (N IP ) as the dependent variable, the
second for Net Insider Purchase Ratio (N IP R), the third for Net Insider Share
Purchase Ratio (N ISP R). Standard t-statistics are included in parentheses. ***significant at the 1% level. **- 5% significance level.
Insiderbuyingi = δ0 + δ1 Sizei + δ2 (B/M )i + δ3 (βM )i + εi
Dependent variable
Size
N IP
-0.043***
(-2.69)

B/M
1.521***
(4.45)

βM
1.911***
(4.29)

N IP R

-0.048**
(-2.40)

0.258***
(6.00)

0.241***
(6.18)

N ISP R

-0.005**
(-2.51)

0.287***
(6.52)

0.225***
(5.55)

(N IP R), and the Net Insider Share Purchase Ratio (N ISP R), respectively.13 As can
be seen, the results are similar in sign and significance regardless of which measure of
insider trading is used. The consistently negative and significant coefficient for Size
indicates that insiders are more likely to buy if their firm is a small cap firm. The
consistently positive coefficients for B/M and β indicate that insiders are also more
likely to buy if their firm has a high B/M value or a high beta. The first two of these
results are largely consistent with those of Lakonishok and Lee (2001), who also found
that insiders tended to buy small firms and high B/M firms during normal trading
periods. The negative coefficient for Size could indicate that insiders are aware that the
market for small stocks is less efficient. It could also mean that insiders for large
13

The regression was also performed with the total insider sales of each firm on the left hand side. The
signs were consistent with those reported in Table 2.7. Not only were small stocks, high B/M stocks,
and high-beta stocks more likely to be bought by insiders, they were also were less likely to be sold by
insiders.
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companies are more heavily policed by firm management, which makes it harder for
them to capitalize on inside information. For example, many large companies, especially
banks, prohibited their insiders from trading at all in September, 2008.

2.4.4

Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of Returns to Insider Trading

If insiders truly are predicting returns, then we should observe a relationship between
the future excess returns to a stock and how frequently that stock was bought or sold
by insiders. I consider the following multivariate relationship, similar to the regressions
performed by Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Seyhun (1990):

RETi = γ0 + γN IP N IPi + γS Sizei + γBM (B/M )i + γβ (βM )i + εi

(2.5)

where RETi is the holding-period raw return to stock i minus the value weighted
NYSE/AMEX/ Nasdaq market return.14 The regression also includes the net insider
purchases for each stock for the last two months of 2008 (N IPi ), market capitalization
in billions (Sizei ), and the book-to-market value ((B/M )i ). The market betas ((βM )i )
are also included in the regression. Recall these were estimated using pre-sample period
data from equations (2.1) and (2.2). The results presented use the beta for each stock
generated from the Fama-French 3-factor model in (2.2) as a right hand side variable to
control for market risk. Using the CAPM betas estimated from (2.1) instead does not
substantially change any results. Using either the CAPM or Fama-French corrected
14

This is the same measure used in much of the insider trading literature, including Lakonishok and
Lee (2001).
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abnormal returns in place of the raw returns also does not appreciably change any of
the primary results in terms of the coefficients on the insider trading variable.15
Lakonishok and Lee (2008) suggests that the relationship between insider trading
and future returns, during normal trading periods, is sensitive to firm size. The most
likely reason for this is that small stocks carry significantly higher transactions costs
(Chan and Lakonishok, 1995). This suggests that the market for small cap stocks is less
efficient than the one for large cap stocks. Thus we would expect that returns to smaller
firms should be more sensitive to the insider trading variable, N IP . To capture this
interaction between size and the degree of insider trading, I split the sample into deciles
based on market capitalization. Small cap stocks are those in the lowest three deciles of
Size, while medium caps are those in the four middle deciles, and large caps are those
in the three highest deciles. I also reorganize the post-crash return sample into the four
quarters of 2009 and perform the regression for each quarter separately.
The results for these regressions are in Table 2.8. The panel labeled “All”
presents the regression results for all stocks in the sample. The coefficient on N IP is
positive and significant through the third quarter of 2009, which suggests that insiders
are successfully predicting returns through the third quarter of 2009 (six to eight
months after the crash). These results indicate that insiders are predicting returns over
much longer time horizons than those reported by either Finnerty (1976) (three
months) or Chowdhury et al. (1993) (two months or less). Insiders do the best job of

15

However, since these returns are already corrected for size, B/M and the market excess return, the
control variables mostly become less significant as might be expected.
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Table 2.8: Returns to Insider Purchases by Size and Quarter - NIP
Regression results for equation (2.5) on the effect of insider trading on abnormal returns. The left hand side variable is
raw returns minus the value weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq market return. The measure of insider trading for each
stock are the Net Insider Purchases (N IPi ). Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses below
estimates. The right hand side variables are the insider trading variable N IP , market capitalization (Size),
book-to-market (B/M ), and each stock’s market beta as estimated from (2). The regression is performed for each quarter
in 2009. The first subset of results shows the effect for all stocks. The second, for stocks with small market capitalizations
(less than $95m), the third for medium size market caps (between $95m and $880m), and the fourth for large market caps
(above $880m). ***- significant at the 1% level **- 5% significance level. *- 10% significance level.
RETi = γ0 + γN IP N IPi + γS Sizei + γBM (B/M )i + γβ (βM )i + εi
Size
All

Small

Medium

Large

2009 Quarter
1

N IP
0.0028**
(2.00)

Size
0.0004
(1.33)

B/M
0.0350**
(2.01)

βM
0.0096
(0.63)

2

0.0064***
(4.27)

-0.0013***
(-3.25)

-0.0090
(-0.19)

0.1756***
(9.49)

3

0.0031***
(3.10)

-0.0003
(-0.67)

0.1026***
(3.48)

0.0812***
(5.45)

4

-0.0008
(-0.80)

0.0004**
(2.00)

0.0027
(0.19)

0.0043
(0.11)

1

0.0053*
(1.82)

-1.248
(-1.32)

-0.0026
(-0.10)

0.0210
(0.57)

2

0.0033
(1.38)

0.9423
(0.77)

-0.0518*
(-1.72)

0.1408***
(3.99)

3

0.0033
(1.32)

0.614
(0.60)

0.1312***
(2.82)

0.0948***
(3.41)

4

-0.0020
(1.11)

0.2146
(0.35)

0.0019
(0.09)

-0.0012
(0.03)

1

0.0040*
(1.67)

0.0607
(1.11)

0.0265
(0.88)

0.0212
(1.05)

2

0.0097***
(3.59)

-0.1151
(-1.59)

-0.0282
(-0.18)

0.1697***
(5.23)

3

0.0050**
(2.27)

0.0012
(0.02)

0.0569
(1.44)

0.0676***
(2.47)

4

0.0027
(1.29)

0.0415
(1.06)

0.0113
(0.54)

0.0031
(0.19)

1

-0.0001
(-0.07)

0.0001
(0.33)

0.0429
(1.13)

0.0165
(0.75)

2

-0.0001
(-0.10)

-0.0002
(-1.00)

-0.0343
(0.74)

0.2150***
(8.14)

3

0.0014*
(1.75)

-0.0003**
(-1.83)

0.0522
(1.33)

0.0962***
(5.70)

4

-0.0007
(-0.84)

0.0001
(0.54)

-0.0473**
(-2.03)

0.0230*
(1.70)
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predicting returns for the second quarter of 2009 (January-March 2009), or 3-5 months
after the crash.
The next three panels of Table 2.8 perform the same regressions for the different
size groups. As expected, insider trades in small and medium cap stocks are doing the
best job of predicting returns, with positive, statistically significant coefficients in the
first two to three quarters. Insider trades in large cap stocks do appear to predict
returns in the third quarter of 2009, but the magnitude of these returns are quite small
compared to those for the small and medium cap stocks. Overall, it appears that the
small and medium cap stocks are mostly, if not wholly responsible for the large spread
in returns to insider trading portfolios. Table 2.8 is replicated with N IP R, and
N ISP R in place of N IP as the insider trading variable. The results are included in
Tables 2.9 and 2.10, respectively. Most of the important results for insider trading are
unchanged in terms of sign and significance, but different measures do seem to influence
the timing of the estimated returns. For instance, when N IP R is used on the right
hand side, the positive returns for the first quarter seem to weaken, though the positive
returns for the second and third quarters of 2009 remain significant. Most of the
statistically significant returns appear for the medium stocks. This is likely because
returns to the small stocks are imprecisely estimated. The coefficients for the insider
trading variable in the small and medium portfolios are similar to each other, but large
compared to the large stocks. This seems to suggest that here, as in Lakonishok and
Lee (2001), and Chan and Lakonishok (1995), the market for large firms’ stock is more
efficient than that of smaller firms. The other variables are included strictly for control.
The coefficient on the β for each stock is reliably positive and significant, indicating
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Table 2.9: Returns to Insider Purchases by Size and Quarter - NIPR
Regression results for equation (2.5) on the effect of insider trading on abnormal returns. The left hand side variable is
raw returns minus the value weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq market return. The measure of insider trading for each
stock is the Net Insider Purchase Ratio (N IP Ri ). Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses below
estimates. The right hand side variables are market capitalization (Size), book-to-market (B/M ), and each stock’s
market beta as estimated from (2). The regression is performed for each quarter in 2009. The first subset of results shows
the effect for all stocks. The second, for stocks with small market capitalizations (less than $95m), the third for medium
size market caps (between $95m and $880m), and the fourth for large market caps (above $880m). ***- null hypothesis of
γ = 0 rejected at the 1% significance level **- rejected at 5% significance level. *- rejected at 10% significance level.
RETi = γ0 + γN IP N IPi + γS Sizei + γBM (B/M )i + γβ (βM )i + εi

Size
All

Small

Medium

Large

2009 Quarter
1

N IP R
0.0142
(1.41)

Size
0.0003
(1.09)

B/M
-0.0355**
(-2.00)

βM
0.0115
(0.74)

2

0.0620***
(5.31)

-0.0013***
(-3.03)

-0.0153
(-0.33)

0.1729***
(9.53)

3

0.0198**
(2.51)

-0.0003
(-1.58)

0.1022***
(3.43)

0.0824***
(5.58)

4

0.0086
(1.35)

0.0005**
(2.40)

-0.0061
(-0.47)

0.0008
(0.07)

1

0.0224
(0.55)

-1.201
(-1.25)

0.0032
(0.12)

0.0257
(0.69)

2

0.0241
(0.70)

0.9935
(0.80)

-0.0521*
(-1.70)

0.1435***
(4.09)

3

0.0283
(1.07)

0.6755
(0.66)

0.1307***
(2.82)

0.0975***
(3.41)

4

0.0211
(1.08)

0.2622
(0.43)

0.0171
(0.84)

-0.0206
(-0.84)

1

0.0066
(0.51)

0.0618
(1.14)

0.0259
(0.85)

0.0214
(1.07)

2

0.0643***
(3.74)

-0.1073
(-1.52)

-0.0341
(-0.21)

0.1734***
(5.46)

3

0.0275**
(2.02)

0.0007
(0.01)

0.0548
(1.35)

0.0709***
(2.83)

4

0.0192*
(1.85)

0.0448
(1.16)

0.0094
(0.45)

0.0037
(0.26)

1

-0.0046
(-0.39)

0.0002
(0.62)

0.0430
(1.15)

0.0184
(0.82)

2

0.0215*
(1.89)

-0.0001
(-0.75)

-0.0349
(-0.76)

0.2057***
(7.86)

3

0.0075
(0.89)

-0.0003*
(-1.88)

0.0506
(1.31)

0.0968***
(5.71)

4

-0.0083
(-1.20)

0.0001
(0.61)

-0.0468**
(-2.25)

0.0174
(1.25)
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Table 2.10: Returns to Insider Purchases by Size and Quarter - NISPR
Regression results for equation (2.5) on the effect of insider trading on abnormal returns. The left hand side variable is
raw returns minus the value weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq market return. The measure of insider trading for each
stock is the Net Insider Share Purchase Ratio (N ISP Ri ). Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses
below estimates. The right hand side variables are market capitalization (Size), book-to-market (B/M ), and each stock’s
market beta as estimated from (2). The regression is performed for each quarter in 2009. The first subset of results shows
the effect for all stocks. The second, for stocks with small market capitalizations (less than $95m), the third for medium
size market caps (between $95m and $880m), and the fourth for large market caps (above $880m). ***- null hypothesis of
γ = 0 rejected at the 1% significance level **- rejected at 5% significance level. *- rejected at 10% significance level.
RETi = γ0 + γN IP N IPi + γS Sizei + γBM (B/M )i + γβ (βM )i + εi

Size
All

Small

Medium

Large

2009 Quarter
1

N ISP R
0.0202**
(2.08)

Size
0.0003
(1.19)

B/M
0.0334**
(1.88)

βM
0.0104
(0.67)

2

0.0500***
(4.70)

-0.0013***
(-3.01)

-0.0136
(-0.29)

0.1766***
(9.54)

3

0.0138*
(1.72)

-0.0003*
(-1.68)

0.1034***
(3.46)

0.0841***
(5.67)

4

0.0088
(1.40)

0.0005**
(2.43)

-0.0064
(-0.49)

0.0009
(0.08)

1

0.0290
(0.79)

-1.210
(-1.27)

0.0020
(0.07)

0.0255
(0.69)

2

-0.0037
(-0.09)

0.9535
(0.75)

-0.0501
(-1.64)

0.1441***
(4.08)

3

0.0301
(1.26)

0.6550
(0.64)

0.1298***
(2.80)

0.0974***
(3.41)

4

0.0179
(0.96)

0.2405
(0.39)

0.0168
(0.83)

-0.0206
(-0.84)

1

0.0149
(1.17)

0.0676
(1.25)

0.0239
(0.79)

0.0196
(0.99)

2

0.0514***
(3.57)

-0.1201
(-1.63)

-0.0337
(-0.21)

0.1782***
(5.40)

3

0.0158
(1.08)

-0.0091
(-0.16)

0.0563
(1.38)

0.0745***
(2.95)

4

0.0186*
(1.82)

0.0434
(1.13)

0.0089
(0.42)

0.0044
(0.29)

1

0.0027
(0.23)

0.0002
(0.63)

0.0427
(1.13)

0.0152
(0.68)

2

0.0195*
(1.78)

-0.0002
(-0.74)

-0.0358
(-0.77)

0.2072***
(7.99)

3

0.0031
(0.37)

-0.0003*
(-1.89)

0.0506
(1.31)

0.0989***
(5.77)

4

0.0098
(1.53)

0.0001
(0.62)

-0.0473**
(-2.27)

0.0171
(1.25)
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Table 2.11: Returns to Insider Purchases by B/M and Quarter
Regression results for equation (2.5) on the effect of insider trading on abnormal returns. The left hand side variable is
raw returns minus the value weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq market return. In the first column, the measure of insider
trading for each stock are Net Insider Purchases (N IPi ). In the second column, the measure of insider trading for each
stock is the Net Insider Purchase Ratio (N IP Ri ). In the last column, the measure of insider trading for each stock is the
Net Insider Share Purchase Ratio (N ISP Ri ). Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses below
estimates. The other independent variables are, market capitalization (Size), book-to-market (B/M ), and each stock’s
market beta as estimated from (2). The regression is performed for each quarter in 2009. The first subset of results shows
the effect for all stocks. The second, for stocks with low book-to-market values (less than 0.11), the third for middle
book-to-market values (between 0.11 and 0.48), and the fourth for high book-to-market (above 0.48). ***- null hypothesis
of γ = 0 rejected at the 1% significance level **- rejected at 5% significance level. *- rejected at 10% significance level.
RETi = γ0 + γInsiderT radingi + γS Sizei + γBM (B/M )i + γβ (βM )i + εi

B/M Group
All

Low B/M

Middle B/M

High B/M

2009 Quarter
1

N IP
0.0028**
(2.04)

N IP R
0.0142
(1.41)

N ISP R
0.0202**
(2.08)

2

0.0064***
(4.22)

0.0620***
(5.31)

0.0500***
(4.72)

3

0.0031***
(3.04)

0.0197**
(2.51)

0.0138
(1.72)

4

-0.0008
(-0.78)

0.0086
(1.35)

0.0088
(1.40)

1

0.0029
(1.52)

0.0530***
(2.94)

0.0544***
(3.12)

2

0.0038
(1.44)

0.0385**
(2.12)

0.0338*
(1.91)

3

0.0010
(0.76)

0.0100
(0.66)

0.0115
(0.07)

4

-0.0001
(-0.44)

0.0073
(0.58)

0.0112
(0.92)

1

0.0028**
(1.88)

0.0085
(0.62)

0.0028*
(1.88)

2

0.0046**
(2.50)

0.0324**
(2.55)

0.0047**
(2.50)

3

0.0026**
(2.39)

0.0146
(1.48)

0.0264**
(2.39)

4

0.0007
(0.46)

0.0094
(0.97)

0.0064
(0.68)

1

0.0037
(1.18)

-0.0100
(-0.40)

-0.0078
(-0.33)

2

0.0041*
(1.73)

0.0518**
(2.24)

0.0317
(1.23)

3

0.0044*
(1.69)

0.0231
(1.27)

0.0236
(1.36)

4

-0.0023
(-1.28)

0.0149
(1.18)

0.0152
(1.31)

46

that the higher beta stocks in each sub-sample are predictably earning higher returns.
The coefficients for Size and B/M are mostly insignificant.
I perform the same regressions for B/M groups in Table 2.11, with the controls
suppressed for brevity. Even though insiders tended to buy high B/M stocks during the
portfolio formation period (see section 2.4.3) no real pattern of predictive ability
emerges among the B/M groups. For N IP as the insider trading variable, the medium
and high B/M groups do a better job of predicting returns than the low B/M group,
but this is not robust to the other measures of insider trading.

2.5

Conclusion

The predictive power of insider trading has been well established in the literature.
However, I find no evidence that insiders sold heavily before the crash of 2008, nor can I
find any support for the hypothesis that insiders predicted the crash by selling their
stocks prior to the crash if they did especially poorly during the crash. There was,
however, a large increase in insider buys during and immediately after the crash, and
the future returns to the stocks that were most bought during the period after the crash
did very well relative to the market. Portfolios comprised of stocks whose insiders
bought heavily after the crash earned an additional 26-32% abnormal returns compared
to the CAPM and Fama-French models over a 12-month holding period from January
to December, 2009. This was far above the abnormal returns reported by Finnerty
(1976), Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), and most of the literature on insider
trading during normal periods. These returns lasted a very long time, persisting at least
until the third quarter of 2009, 9-11 months after the crash, much longer than during
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normal trading periods as shown by Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986), and Chowdhury, et
al. (1993). As expected, most of the returns were generated by small and medium cap
stocks, consistent with the conjecture that the market for large cap stocks is more
informationally efficient.
These results compare favorably with Seyhun (1990) and Seyhun (1999), which
study the 1987 market crash. More research is likely needed in this area to understand
the behavior of informed traders during market panics versus during normal trading
periods, and whether this empirical pattern extends to other asset markets and other
stock market crashes.
The presence of large returns seems to violate the Efficient Markets Hypothesis,
but this need not necessarily be true. If investors have not had sufficient exposure to
market crashes, they will not know where to look for the strongest signals. If insider
information is carrying stronger signals during a crash than during normal trading
periods, it will take time for investors to learn this. The general pattern of “learning by
repetition” is almost universally observed in the repeated asset market experiments of
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), where human subjects routinely produce bubbles
and crashes in simulated asset markets. This “bubble and crash” behavior persists for
the first couple of trials for a group of subjects before the price converges to
fundamentals by the third or fourth repetition. It is likely that investors learn from past
experiences in asset markets in the real world as well. Since market crashes do not
occur very often in the lifetime of a typical investor, it is likely that they do not know to
look for such high returns following post-crash insider trades. It is also true that
comprehensive data reporting on insider trading has only been available for the past few
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decades, and even then, only for asset markets in the most highly developed economies.
If this is true, then this research, combined with Seyhun (1990, 1999) may prompt
traders to look for large returns to portfolios based on insider purchases after market
crashes. It is also likely that we should see lower returns to insider trading in markets
that crash more often. Therefore, while the same pattern is observed after the 1987 and
2008 market crashes, we might not expect to find these large returns in future crashes
since investors may learn to arbitrage these gains away.
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CHAPTER 3
SHOULD CENTRAL BANKS INTERVENE IN ASSET MARKETS?
3.1

Introduction

Should central banks react to asset bubbles? This issue has been hotly debated within
the economics profession, particularly since the late 2000’s housing bubble and
subsequent global financial crisis. One side of the argument (see Cecchetti et al (2000),
and Roubini (2006)) contends that central bank policy can and should respond to
fluctuations in asset prices since wild swings in asset markets may be accompanied by
large fluctuations in the output gap and employment. The counterargument suggests
that it is not even possible to target asset prices because deviations from fundamentals
are unobservable, and even if it was possible, the outcome might be destabilizing (see
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Posen (2006)).
Comparatively little attention, however, has been paid to the microeconomic
aspects of bubble bursting policies by central banks. It may not be a stretch to suggest
that arguments in favor of bubble bursting presuppose the idea that bubble bursting is
welfare improving for the individual agents in asset markets. If the central bank can
identify when assets are overpriced, it can protect naive buyers from malicious sellers
who may have more information than they do. The existence of these “bad sellers” also
creates a lemons problem. Buyers cannot know beforehand if they are buying from a
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“good seller” who thinks the asset might be worth something, and a bad seller who
knows the asset is worthless. Thus, the good sellers are also harmed because the buyers
will bid down the price if they believe that there are unscrupulous sellers trying to take
advantage of naive buyers (Conlon (2015)). We can eliminate the problem of
asymmetric information by having the central bank announce when it thinks we have
entered a state of the world where at least some sellers know the asset is overpriced.
This is a tempting argument to make, and it does have some merit.
One simple response is that the central bank cannot know with certainty when
assets are overpriced, and therefore, by having a policy of deterring bad sellers, might
cause perfectly good, wealth creating transactions to go unconsummated and therefore
hurt buyers and good sellers (see Kai and Conlon (2008) for a detailed exploration of
this argument).
However, there exists another, more subtle issue. Even if the central bank can
accurately idenfity when assets are overpriced, the argument that the central bank
should deflate the price of those assets does not address the following unforeseen
consequence of such a policy. Specifically, eliminating the lemons problem will cause
buyers to raise their prices in the states of the world where they are now encouraged
because bad sellers do not exist. The increase in prices could cause the buyers to be
worse off than before if the increase in price is large enough to overcome the good that
was done for them by eliminating those transactions from which the buyers bought from
bad sellers.
The purpose of this paper is to address exactly this point. We do not ask
whether the central bank can identify states of the world where overpriced assets exist.
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Instead we imagine a world where the central bank knows with certainty whether
anyone knows that assets are overpriced, and ask, “Can the elimination of overpricing in
asset markets make the agents in the world better off?” As we will explain below, this is
a question that has gone only partially answered because of the lack of attention that
the microeconomic issues of bubble policy have recieved. This paper attempts to fill the
lacuna in the literature by building on work done by Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite
(1993) (hereafter AMP), Conlon (2004), and most importantly, Conlon (2015).
AMP presents a simple asset market model with three heterogeneous individuals
and asymmetric information. In certain of the states of the world, one or more of the
sellers receive a private signal that the asset will pay no dividend. As a result, the agent
(a “bad seller”) will try to sell the worthless asset to an unsuspecting buyer. However,
the buyer does not know whether or not anyone has received the negative signal, so from
the buyer’s perspective, sellers might potentially be “good sellers” willing to sell to him.
Thus, the buyers are willing to pay a positive price for the asset, even if there’s a chance
that the seller knows they are selling a worthless asset. In the states of the world where
this occurs, we say that the asset is “overpriced”. In these states there is at least one
agent who knows that the true value of the asset is zero, but the market price is positive.
AMP go on to show that even if all three agents receive the same bad signal
(everyone realizes the asset is worthless), the price can still be positive. This is because
even though each agent knows the true value of the asset is zero, none of the agents
realize that the other agents also know this. Since, from the point of view of each seller,
there is a possibility that the other agents did not recieve the signal, he hopes to sell the
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asset in the market for a positive price. AMP call this state a strong bubble because
each of the agents realizes (in equilibrium!) that the asset is overpriced.
Conlon (2004) simplifies AMP by showing that their central results can be
expressed in a model with just two agents, making it vastly easier to construct
numerical examples and, as this paper will show, conduct comparative dynamics
experiments on the welfare of the agents in the model.
Finally, Conlon (2015) incorporates a broad policy of general deflation of
overpriced assets into a simple rational greater fool bubble model like the one presented
in AMP In this paper, the central bank announces any time it observes a state of the
world where at least one agent has recieved the private signal that the asset is
worthless. In other words, if only one agent knows the true value, the central bank also
knows, and announces this fact without fail.
Conlon (2015) performs comparative dynamics experiments to determine how
bubble policy affects the agents’ welfare in the model. However, his model, like AMP,
assumes constant marginal utilities, so buyers have perfectly elastic demands for the
asset, and therefore have zero consumer surplus in both the bubble equilibrium and the
post-policy equilibrium. Thus, buyers are not affected by the policy, so his welfare
analysis is restricted to the effects on sellers only. Conlon shows that bubble policy has
an ambiguous effect on sellers’ welfare. Sellers lose out in the states where they were
able to sell an overpriced asset to naive buyers (the greater fools), but gain in the
remaining states because inaction by the central bank provides an implicit endorsement
of the asset’s price (guaranteeing that there are no bad sellers) and encourages buyers to
offer higher prices.
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This paper builds on the discussion begun by Conlon (2015), by adding risk
averse agents to the model. Downward sloping marginal utility schedules produce
downward sloping demand curves, so buyers receive positive consumer surplus. As a
result, the welfare effects now extend to buyers as well as sellers. This can inform the
discussion on bubble bursting or general deflation policies because it can show us
whether the policy accomplishes its goal of protecting naive buyers from malicious
sellers. As we will soon see, this is not a trivial extension. Concave utility functions
require us to keep track of the effect of wealth on the marginal utilities in each state,
and many utility functions do not yield analytic solutions.
The central result in this paper is that buyers in the market are made worse off
by the policy because the cost of paying higher prices in the absence of the lemons
problem outweighs the benefit of not buying assets known to be worthless. We show this
by first conducting numerical comparative dynamics experiments with several classes of
utility functions. It is always the case that the higher prices generated by the policy
make buyers worse off regardless of which utility function is assumed. This suggests that
bubble bursting policy can only make things worse for the buyers. In addition to this,
the sellers also seem to be hurt by bubble policy relative to a risk neutral baseline case.
Some general theorems are proven to support these results. Theorem 1 shows
that as long as utility is decreasing in absolute risk aversion (DARA), the general
deflation policy will raise non-announcement prices more when the agents become more
risk averse. This result clears up some conceptual difficulties about the type of utility
we want the agents to have to display the kind of behavior we expect. It is also essential
for proving Theorem 2 which shows that, if absolute risk aversion is decreasing, then
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buyers will always be hurt by a policy that deflates overpriced assets. The effect on
sellers is ambiguous.

3.1.1

Bubbles

Several high-profile episodes suggest that large destructive asset bubbles, while
uncommon, occur with some regularity. Historical examples include the Dutch
Tulipmania (1634-1637), the Mississippi Company boom/bust (1720), the South Sea
Company boom/bust (1720), the United States stock market boom and crash
(1920-1929), the Japanese real estate crash (1985-89), the Swedish housing crash
(1990-1992), the NASDAQ tech stock boom/bust (1999), and the 2000’s global housing
boom/bust (2000-2008). In all of these cases, asset prices rose dramatically over a
relatively short period, and then collapsed quickly, though the exact timing varies for
each instance. Many of these examples have coincided with destructive events beyond
the asset market itself. The Japanese asset market crash is frequently cited as one cause
of Japan’s Lost Decade, the US stock market crash in 1929 is often credited for
beginning the Great Depression, and the housing bubble of the late 2000’s is often
blamed for the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.1
It is, in general, difficult to disentangle which of these historical examples
represents a bubble, and which are merely boom/busts in demand or abrupt revisions in
expectations by investors. For instance, suppose that investors feel optimistic that a firm
will be highly profitable in the future. As a result, the price of that firm’s stock will rise
with investor optimism. At some later date, suppose expectations of future profitability
1

See Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) for more examples, and see Garber (2001) for an alternative
interpretation of many historical asset bubbles.
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are revised downward.2 This will cause the price to crash. But can this simple thought
experiment be accurately described a bubble? Or was the market pricing the stocks
appropriately given the available information, which was later updated to induce a large
negative shock to expectations? Regardless of which argument the reader is inclined to
believe, our current understanding of asset bubbles is best described as incomplete.
In some sense, the question of how an asset bubble might occur is, itself, curious.
There is no easy way to see how a reasonably intelligent person might hold an
over-priced asset when placed in an environment with other reasonably intelligent
people. If we know that there is no one else foolish enough to hold an over-priced asset,
how could we ever expect to sell to someone at an overly high price? We therefore
arrive at the result that the more people understand that a tradeable asset is
over-priced, the less likely the asset is to be over-priced.
Modelers therefore have an interesting challenge to overcome. How can a model
produce over-priced assets in a population of intelligent traders?
Even if we suggest that bubbles do indeed exist, the question of how to model
bubble behavior has not been fully addressed. One solution has been to abandon the
idea that traders are fully rational (Harrison and Kreps (1978), Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)). While some of these models, especially Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003), are quite sophisticated, it is conceptually very easy to
generate bubbles if certain traders are systematically irrational. Bubbles can be easily
constructed by having smart traders selling bad assets to overconfident or noise traders
at high prices.
2

A possible example of this may be the late 90’s “tech stock bubble”.
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If all traders are rational, however, then this presents a more difficult problem,
especially if each trader knows all of the other traders in the market are similarly
rational. Rational traders learn from price signals. In Milgrom and Stokey (1983), if an
agent is selling a risky asset at a high price, the rational buyer will ask, “Why is this
investor selling the asset?” The buyer deduces that the seller is sending a negative
signal about the value of the asset. As a result the buyer lowers his willingness to pay
until the seller is no longer willing to sell. Thus, no assets are ever traded, and any
possible overpricing disappears. Hence, with rational actors, the more people believe the
asset is overpriced, the less likely it is that the asset will continue to be overpriced.
As stated already, AMP present a rational heterogeneous-agent bubble model
with three agents and three periods. The agents are prompted to trade with each other
by having different marginal utilities in relevant states of the world, so there are at least
some states in the world where sellers wish to sell to rebalance their portfolios, for
example, and not simply selling on private information. AMP then impose a specific
asymmetric information structure, in which there exist states where one or more agents
receive private information that the asset will pay a dividend of zero. However, since
potential buyers believe that they may be in a state of the world where the other agents
are selling for portfolio rebalancing purposes, these potential buyers are willing to buy,
so a bubble is possible.
AMP’s most important contribution, is that they generate a state in which each
agent values the asset at a price of zero, but the asset has a market price greater than
zero. This occurs because even though each agent realizes the asset is worthless, they
don’t know that the other agents know the asset is worthless. Therefore, they all hope
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to sell to each other at a price higher than zero. Bubble models like this unfortunately
only produce very short-lived bubbles. Once the agents try to sell to each other, they
realize they both received the same information, and the price crashes to zero in the
subsequent period. They also require short-sale constraints, or else the bad sellers would
sell so much of the asset that it would push the price down to zero.

3.2

General model

The model very closely follows the ones in AMP and Conlon (2015). There exists a
competitive market where rational, hetergeneous agents trade money for an asset that
pays a stochastic dividend. We construct the market in a way that produces a strong
bubble (AMP), where each of the agents knows the asset is worthless (will pay a
dividend of zero), yet the market price is above zero. The model achieves this by
generating a state where each seller knows the asset is worthless, but does not know
that the other agent(s) also know that the asset is worthless.
First, we will generate an example similar to the one presented Conlon (2015).
We generate a strong bubble for a specific state of the world where each agent knows
with certainty that the asset will pay a dividend of zero, but the price is positive.
We then depart from AMP and Conlon (2015) by supposing that the marginal
utilities used to generate the bubble are not given exogenously, but instead are
generated from risk averse agents.3 We then work backwards, from the marginal
3

In both of these earlier papers, the agents’ marginal utilities are constant for each state of the
world. This is useful for simplifying the analysis, but renders the model incapable of delivering confident
qualitative predictions about the welfare effects on the agents. AMP briefly discusses downward sloping
marginal utilities but performs no welfare analysis.
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utilities supporting the initial bubble equilibrium, to calculate the final wealth
belonging to each agent necessary to reproduce these marginal utilities for a given
concave utility function, as well as the corresponding initial wealths. We can then
calculate the utility generated by these final wealth holdings, given the bubble.
In the final step, we assume the existence of a central bank which can perfectly
observe states of the world where at least one agent observes that the asset is worthless.
The central bank can protect buyers in the market by announcing the state of the world
whenever it observes these conditions. We will call this a policy of “general deflation of
overpriced assets” as in Conlon (2015).4 We then recalculate the equilibrium prices and
trades in the asset market after the policy announcement, calculate the final wealth for
each of the agents in each state, calculate their resulting expected utility, and then
compare to the original bubble equilibrium. By doing this, we can determine the
qualitative (and quantitative) welfare effects of the general deflation policy.
The welfare implications of either a bubble bursting policy or a policy of general
deflation, even when the central bank can perfectly identify asset bubbles, are not
obvious. Suppose that the central bank actively protects the market against sellers who
know the asset is overpriced, by announcing when it observes states where at least some
of the agents know the asset is overpriced. When the central bank then turns out to not
make such an announcement, the central bank implicitly endorses the price of the asset.
The implicit endorsement of these asset prices can raise prices in the market, which may
4
The general deflation policy should not be confused with a “bubble bursting” policy, in which the
central bank only announces when it observes a bubble. This may lead to different conclusions about
the agents’ welfare, and will be discussed in a later paper.
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reduce the utility of buyers. Other implications (notably, those of a central bank that
imperfectly observes bubbles) are of potential importance, but are not discussed here.

3.2.1

Assumptions and setup

There are two agents in the model, who can be thought of as being heterogeneous
traders in an asset market. These agents maximize their utility across all states of the
world. We will call the two agents Ellen (E) and Frank (F ), denoted by i ∈ {E, F }.
The market lasts for three periods t = 1, 2, 3. After period 3, the asset pays a stochastic
liquifying dividend, the market closes, and agents consume their wealth. There are a
finite number of states of the world ω, where ω is an element of a state space Ω. The
agents have a common, prior probability distribution over Ω, given by π(ω) which is
known to everyone.
Agents are endowed with an initial amount of both a risky asset, ai,0 (ω), and a
riskless asset (money) that can be used to acquire the risky asset or can be consumed.
An agent’s holdings of the risky asset at time t, are given by ai,t (ω). The risky asset
cannot be used in consumption, but can be sold for money, or held in hopes of recieving
the dividend d at time t = 3.
There are no short-sales of the risky asset, so ai,t (ω) ≥ 0. As in AMP and
Conlon (2004, 2015) we have to rule out short-sales of the asset because in the presence
of an overpriced asset, sellers will short sell until the asset is no longer overpriced.
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3.2.1.1

The information structure

B
G
G
B
G
G
G
There are nine possible states of the world, eG
1 , e2 , e3 , e , f1 , f2 , f3 , f , b. Each

state is equally likely to occur, so π(ω) = 1/9 for all ω. The risky asset pays a dividend,
G
d, only in states eG
3 and f3 .

G
G
In states eG
1 , e2 , and e3 , Ellen is a “good seller”. That is, she wishes to sell but

thinks the asset might be worth something. In states b and eB , Ellen is a “bad seller”.
In these states, Ellen knows the asset will pay no dividend, so she clearly wants to sell
to Frank. Finally, Ellen is a buyer in states f1G , f2G , f3G , and f B . Symmetrically, there
are states of the world in which Frank is a bad seller (f B and b), where he is a good
G
G
B
seller (f1G , f2G , and f3G ), and where he is a buyer (eG
1 , e2 , e3 , e ). Note that in state b,

both agents are “bad sellers” who know the asset is worthless.
Lastly, we assume that agents are endowed with a single unit of the asset when
they are sellers. The buyers are endowed with none of the asset.
Accordingly, we can write Ellen’s period 1 information partition as:

Buyer
G G
E1BS = {b, eB }, E1GS = {eG
= {f B , f1G , f2G , f3G }
1 , e2 , e3 }, and E1

Frank’s period 1 information partition is likewise:
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G G
F1BS = {b, f B }, F1GS = {f1G , f2G , f3G }, and F1Buyer = {eB , eG
1 , e2 , e3 }

The information partitions for period 1 are represented graphically in Figure 1.

Figure 3.1: Period 1 information partitions. Solid ovals - Ellen, Dashed ovals - Frank,
Dotted ovals - dividend paying states

G
In period 2, the agents learn whether the state is b, eG
1 , or f1 . Thus the period 2

information partition for Ellen is

3
G
E21 = {b}, E22 = {eG
1 }, E2 = {f1 },
Buyer
G
E2BS = {eB }, E2GS = {eG
= {f B , f2G , f3G }
2 , e3 }, and E2

and likewise for Frank. The nontrivial part of the new information structure is
G
displayed in Figure 2 with states b, eG
1 and f1 omitted.

In period 3, all information is revealed. The agents learn the true state of the
world, the dividend is paid, and agents consume their wealth.
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Figure 3.2: Period 2 information partitions. Solid ovals - Ellen, Dashed ovals - Frank,
Dotted ovals - dividend paying states

3.2.2

The bubble equilibrium

We begin by generating a bubble equilibrium where the final marginal utilities for each
state of the world are as in Table 1, where x, y, and z are all greater than zero. These
marginal utilities will generate certainty equivalent prices for the risky asset in each
state of the world. They are also arranged in such a way that changing x, y, and z do
not affect the asset’s price. They simply control the weight of importance that the
G G
agents give to different states of the world.5 In states {b, eB , eG
1 , e2 , e3 } Ellen is endowed

with one unit of the risky asset at the beginning of the world. In states
{b, f B , f1G , f2G , f3G }, Frank is endowed with one unit of the asset.
Table 3.1: Assumed marginal utilities in the bubble equilibrium

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Ellen

x

x

z

2y

y

y

5z

z

2z

Frank

x

z

x

5z

z

2z

2y

y

y

Working backwards, at t = 3, all information has been revealed and the agents
know the true state of the world, thus p3 (ω) = d(ω). For each preceding time period,
the certainty equivalent willingness to pay is defined as
5

At this point, these marginal utilities are simply assumed. We will work backwards from this example
to derive the implied wealths in each state necessary to produce this particular bubble equilibrium.
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W T Pi (ω) =

E [M Ui (ω)pt+1 (ω)]
E [M Ui (ω]

for ω ∈ Pi,t

(3.1)

where Pi,t is any given information set for agent i at time t. The market is competitive
with short sale constraints, so the price, pt (ω), is just the greater of the two
willingnesses to pay. As an illustration, we suppose the asset will pay a dividend of
G
d = 4 in states eG
3 and f3 , and a dividend of d = 0 in all other states (as in Figure 1).
G
For F2Buyer , in period 2 Frank believes the state could be eB , eG
2 , or e3 . Applying (3.1)

to obtain Frank’s period 2 willingness to pay, using the marginal utilities from Table 1,
we have, for ω ∈ F2Buyer

h
i
E M UF (ω)p3 (ω)|ω ∈ F2Buyer
(z)(0)(1/9) + (z)(0)(1/9) + (2z)(4)(1/9)
h
i
W T PF (ω) =
=2
=
(z)(1/9) + (z)(1/9) + (2z)(1/9)
E M UF (ω)|ω ∈ F2Buyer

Ellen’s problem is similar. Within the set F Buyer , Ellen has two possible information
BS
G
sets: E2BS = {eB }, and E2GS = {eG
2 , e3 }. For ω ∈ E2 ,

W T PE (ω) =

(x)(0)(1/9)
=0
(1)

and, for ω ∈ E GS ,
W T PE (ω) =

(y)(0)(1/9) + (y)(4)(1/9)
=2
(y) + (y)
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G
Therefore, in state eB , Ellen sells to Frank at a price of 2, and in states eG
2 , and e3 ,

Ellen is indifferent between selling, and not selling at the price of 2. Similar calculations
can be made for ω ∈ E2Buyer , and also for the period 1 information sets for both agents.
Applying similar calculations to the remaining states in both periods 1 and 2, we
arrive at an equilibrium set of prices and net sales for each state of the world. The
prices are shown below in Table 2, and the pattern of trade is shown in Table 3. In
G
period 2, Ellen sells to Frank in information sets E2BS = {eB } and E2GS = {eG
2 , e3 },

while Frank sells to Ellen in information sets F2BS = {f B } and F2GS = {f2G , f3G }.6
Table 3.2: Bubble Equilibrium Prices

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Period 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Period 2

0

2

2

0

2

2

0

2

2

Period 3

0

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

4

Table 3.3: Sales from Ellen to Frank - Bubble Equilibrium

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Period 1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Period 2

0

1

-1

0

1

1

0

-1

-1

Period 3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

This exercise generates three states of the world where the asset is overpriced. In
states b, eB , and f B , at least one agent knows the asset pays a final dividend of zero, yet
the price is above zero in period 1. In state b, both agents realize the asset is worthless,
but the price is positive. This is the familiar strong bubble result from AMP. In state b,
Ellen knows the asset is worthless, but does not know that Frank also knows the asset is
worthless. From her point of view, she may be in eB , in which case Frank will be in
6

It is not an accident that we have chosen the parameters such that trade occurs only in period 2.
This greatly simplifies the analysis.
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F1Buyer . This means that she believes that Frank might believe that the true state could
be eG
3 . If this is the case, Frank will be willing to pay a positive price for the asset.
Frank, meanwhile, is thinking the exact same thing about Ellen in state b, so in period
1, both agents are hoping to sell a worthless asset to the other in the next period. In
period 2, both agents learn that since they’re trying to sell to each other, the true state
must be b, and the bubble crashes to a price of 0 in period 2.

3.2.3

Bubble policy and the baseline scenario with constant marginal utility

Now that we have a well defined equilibrium that generates a bubble, we can examine
what happens when a market authority, e.g., a central bank, uses policy to prevent
overpricing. We assume the existence of a central bank that can identify when there are
overpriced assets in the market (i.e., if the true state of the world is eB , f B , or b). Since
the bank knows the true state of the world when there are bad sellers in the market, the
central bank can pursue a policy of “general deflation of overpriced assets” by
announcing to the public when it observes these states.
We assume that the central bank observes bad sellers with complete accuracy.
This has two important functions. First, it greatly simplifies the analysis. Second, it
allows us to study what the effects of the central bank’s policy could be in the most
perfect of all worlds. In other words, if the central bank cannot improve welfare even in
the case where it knows everything, it surely cannot improve welfare in the vastly more
realistic case where the central bank has limited information.7
7

See Kai and Conlon (2008) for a model, with constant marginal utilities, where the central bank
observes overpricing imperfectly.
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Following Conlon (2015), we examine what happens to the market when the
central bank follows the general deflation policy as described above. In period 1, the
central bank announces whether it knows if the world is in states b, eB , or f B . The
policy forces the price to zero in these states because it is now common knowledge
among the agents that the asset is worthless. Each agent knows the asset is worthless,
each agent knows that the other agent knows the asset is worthless, and each agent
knows that the other agent knows that they know the asset is worthless, etc.8 Ellen’s
new information partition in period 1 is

E11P = {b}, E12P = {eB }, E13P = {f B },
BuyerP
G G
E1BSP = ∅, E1GSP = {eG
= {f1G , f2G , f3G }
1 , e2 , e3 }, and E1

and similarly for Frank, where the superscript P indicates the information sets under
the general deflation policy. As before, assume that in period 2 the agents learn whether
G
the state is eG
1 or f1 . Ellen’s period 2 information partition is then
8

See Allen, Postlewaite, and Shin (1995), Conlon (2004), and Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) for more
discussion of these interesting types of repetitive information structures involving depth of knowledge
problems.
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5P
G
E21P = {b}, E22P = {eB }, E23P = {f B }, E24P = {eG
1 }, E2 = {f1 }
BuyerP
G
E2BSP = ∅, E1GSP = {eG
= {f2G , f3G }
2 , e3 }, and E1

and similarly for Frank.
Re-applying the calculations in Equation (3.1) to the new information structure,
holding the marginal utilities from Table 3.1 constant, we arrive at a new set of prices
and trades shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
Table 3.4: Risk Neutral Prices Under Bubble Bursting Policy

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Period 1

0

0

0

1.33

1.33

1.33

1.33

1.33

1.33

Period 2

0

0

0

0

2.67

2.67

0

2.67

2.67

Period 3

0

0

0

0

0

4

0

0

4

Table 3.5: Sales from Ellen to Frank - Bubble Equilibrium

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Period 1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Period 2

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

-1

-1

Period 3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

The most important thing to notice in the general deflation equilibrium is that
prices have risen in the remaining states where the agents trade. Why did this happen?
Under the general deflation policy, the central bank announces when it observes
overpriced assets, but, as in Conlon (2015), the more important implication is that
when the central bank does not announce, it is providing an implicit endorsement of
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asset prices to the market. By shutting down trade in the bad seller states, buyers no
longer have to worry about buying an asset that the seller definitely knows is
overpriced. As a result, buyers are encouraged to bid up prices because they are buying
an asset that is more likely to pay a dividend.
This can also be interpreted as the elimination of a lemons problem. Because
buyers in the bubble equilibrium have no guarantee that they are buying from someone
who thinks the asset may pay a dividend, they reduce their willingness to pay in all
states of the world. So, the bad sellers also inflict an externality on good sellers by
reducing the price good sellers get for the asset. Elimination of the overpricing in the
bad seller states results in the good sellers receiving higher prices.

3.2.3.1

Seller Welfare

In the risk neutral case we have presented here, buyers have no consumer surplus. This
is because the marginal utilities assumed in Table 3.1 are constant. Therefore, the
demand curve for the asset is perfectly elastic, and welfare comparisons for the buyer
are trivial since consumer surplus is zero in both equilibria. We can, however, make
some general statements about the sellers’ welfare in the market. Because the policy
eliminates overpricing in the market, we may be tempted a priori to conclude that this
policy damages sellers in terms of their expected welfare. This is not necessarily the
case however. Recall that the policy caused the price of the asset to rise in the
remaining states of the world, so sellers are better off in those states. Thus, the overall
effect on the sellers’ welfare is ambiguous and depends on their marginal utilities in the
relevant states of the world. If the sellers are are poorer in the states where they are
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bad sellers (x is large), the policy could make them worse off. If sellers are poorer in the
states where they are good sellers (y is large), the policy will make them better off.
To begin with, we know that a seller in the bubble equilibrium could be in any
G
one of five possible states of the world. Ellen, for example, could be in b, eB , eG
1 , e2 , or

eG
3 (Frank’s problem is similar). Her expected welfare would be her expected proceeds
G
from her period 2 sale of assets in states eB , eG
2 , and e3 , weighted by her marginal

utility in each state

1
EUSeller = (x + y + y)Π(p2 )
9

where Π(p2 ) = ai,2 p2 is the profit from selling ai,2 at price p2 . In the context of the
above example, since Ellen has only one unit of the asset to sell, and the price in the
bubble equilibrium derived above is p2 = 2, we can simplify Ellen’s expected welfare to

1
EUSeller = (x + 2y)(2)
9

When the central bank pursues the general deflation policy, it pushes the price to
zero in the bad seller states. Ellen can no longer sell in these states, but the price rises
in the remaining states. Her expected welfare under the policy is therefore

1
P
EUSeller
= (2y)(2.6667)
9
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Ellen will be hurt by the policy if her expected welfare in the bubble equilibrium
is higher than her expected welfare under the general deflation policy, or if

1
1
3
(x + 2y)(2) > (2y)(2.6667), or y > x
9
9
2

Recall that from Table 3.1, Ellen’s marginal utilities contain y in the good seller
states, and x in the bad seller states. The larger y is, the higher the marginal utility in
the good seller states (e.g., Ellen may be poorer in these states), and thus Ellen ascribes
more importance to these states. If y is larger than x by a factor of 3/2, then Ellen will
be helped by the policy because she is poorer in the states of the world where the price
is rising. The converse is true when x is relatively big compared to y. It easily follows
from this line of analysis that the point where the policy has no effect on the welfare of
sellers (in the risk neutral case) occurs when

3
Baseline: y = x
2

3.3

An Example with Quadratic Utility

The above example can generate some nontrivial welfare effects for the sellers in the
market. However, the buyers are unaffected by this policy. This is because buyers have
constant marginal utilities, so their demand curves are perfectly elastic, and they enjoy
no consumer surplus. While this greatly simplifies the analysis, it is has the distinct
drawback of restricting our welfare discussions of the policy to the sellers. A commonly
stated goal of a bubble bursting policy described above is to protect the buyers of assets
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(the greater fools) from malicious sellers who know the assets are overpriced. If this
type of model is to provide a complete picture of how bubble bursting policy affects the
agents trading in asset markets, it is important that these models be able to seriously
address the welfare of buyers.
In the following section, I provide a model that remedies these criticisms by
introducing agents with risk averse utility functions. Risk aversion implies that the
agents’ marginal utility functions are downward sloping functions of wealth. This will
then yield nonzero consumer surplus, and allow us to perform a nontrivial welfare
analysis for the buyers before and after the policy takes effect.
It is important to realize that while the goal of the policy is to protect naive
buyers from sellers who might know more about the asset then the buyers, there is no
guarantee that the policy will be able to achieve this goal. Recall from the above
experiment in the risk neutral case, that prices rise in some states of the world as a
result of the general deflation policy. If the buyers are poor enough in these states then
they will have high marginal utilities of wealth in these states, so paying higher prices
for the asset could harm them, even if we prevent them from buying in states of the
world where the sellers know the asset to be worthless.
What follows is an example of the above model with a simple quadratic utility
function. The marginal utility curves in this case are downward sloping but linear.
Thus while marginal utility falls as a function of wealth, the rate by which it falls does
not depend on wealth (i.e., U 00 (w) is constant in wealth). We consider this case because
quadratic utility produces an analytic solution for the price, making it relatively
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straightforward to compute a numerical example. We extend the analysis to more
realistic utility functions in Section 4.
We begin this section by supposing that agents with the marginal utilities in
Table 3.1 are risk averse. Then we ask, for what initial wealths in the different states
will, if combined with the trades, prices and dividends, yield the marginal utilities in
Table 1? To answer this, we must first give the agents a specific utility function. We
first assume the agents’ preferences are represented by a quadratic utility function that
depends only on the agent’s final wealth, W :

λ
Ui (W ) = AW − W 2
2

(3.2)

This function produces downward sloping marginal utility curves given by
M Ui (Wi ) =

∂Ui
∂Wi

= Ai − λWi . The parameter λ controls the slope of the marginal utility

curve. As λ → 0, the marginal utility curve flattens out, and the consumer becomes
more risk neutral. To complete the welfare analysis of the agents, we must determine
what wealth they would have needed to have to generate the bubble equilibrium
described in Section 2.

3.3.1

Wealth

Consider the final marginal utility (after the agents have traded) M U (ω) = A − λWi,t=3
derived frim equation (3.2) above, where Wi,t=3 = Wi,3 is the agent i’s final wealth. We
can rearrange this as
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Wi,3 (ω) = (A − M U (ω))/λ.

(3.3)

If we take M U (ω) from Table 3.1, then this equation gives the final wealth necessary in
each state for risk averse agents to wind up with these final marginal utilities. The
initial money holdings of each agent can then be backed out by reversing the trades and
dividend payouts in each state of the world. Recalling that exchange takes place only in
period 2, final wealth is given by

Wi,3 (ω) = Mi,0 (ω) + p2 (ω)Xi,2 (ω) + (ai,0 (ω) − Xi,2 (ω)) d(ω)

(3.4)

where p2 (ω) is the price of the asset in period 2, Mi,0 (ω) is the initial money holdings of
agent i, Xi,2 (ω) is the sales of the asset in period 2, and d(ω) is the dividend the asset
pays. Equation (3.4) states that the final wealth for agent i is given by initial money
holdings, Mi,0 (ω), plus the value of any sales of the asset at time 2, p2 (ω)Xi,2 (ω), plus
the amount of the asset held in period 3 times the dividend it pays, where ai,0 (ω) is the
initial asset holdings, and Xi,2 (ω) is the total sales of the asset at time 2.
B
If we denote pB
2 and Xi,2 as the period 2 prices and net sales from the bubble

equilibrium in Tables 2 and 3 above, equation (3.4) becomes
B
B
Wi,3 (ω) = Mi,0 (ω) + pB
2 (ω)Xi,2 (ω) + (ai,0 (ω) − Xi,2 (ω)d(ω)). Therefore, to yield final,

equilibrium marginal utility M U (ω) in state ω, money holdings in that state would need
to be given by

74

B
B
Mi,0 (ω) = (A − M U (ω))/λ − pB
2 (ω)Xi,2 (ω) − (ai,0 (ω) − Xi,2 )d(ω)

(3.5)

These calculations can be illustrated with a simple numerical example. First, let
y = z = 1 and x = 2/3. This ensures that in the risk neutral case, the deflation policy
will not change the seller’s expected utility. Also let λ = 0.5, d = 4, and A = 15.
Plugging into equation (3.3), Frank’s final wealth in state eG
3 , for example, is given by

WF,3 (eG
3) =

(A − M U (eG
2 ))
= (15 − 2)/0.5 = 26
λ

These calculations are carried out for both agents in all states and the results are
presented in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Implied final wealths for risk averse agents - bubble equilibrium

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Ellen

28.67

28.67

28

26

28

28

20

28

26

Frank

28.67

28

28.67

20

28

26

26

28

28

We can now use (3.5) to calculate the agents’ initial wealths by undoing the
trades, prices, and dividend payments. Again for example, Frank in state eG
3 bought one
B
G
unit of the asset from Ellen at a price of 2, so XF,2
(eG
2 ) = −1 and p2 (e3 ) = 2, while the

dividend paid is 4. Therefore his implied initial wealth before the trade and dividend
payment was

G
G
G
WF,0 (eG
3 ) = WF,3 (e3 ) − p(e3 )(−1) − d(e3 ) = 26 + 2 − 4 = 24
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Carrying out these calculations for both agents in all states of the world give us Table
3.7.
Table 3.7: Implied initial wealths for risk averse agents - bubble equilibrium

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Ellen

28.67

26.67

30

26

26

26

20

30

24

Frank

28.67

30

26.67

20

30

24

26

26

26

Table 3.7 tells us what wealths each agent would need to have entered the
market with, had they had utility given by equation (3.2), in order for the equilibrium
in Tables 2 and 3 to give them the marginal utilities given in Table 3.1. Close
examination of Table 3.7 reveals something interesting about the agents. (For the
G
moment, ignore states eG
1 and f1 ; the agents learn after period 1 that the dividend will

be zero, and no trade occurs rendering these states uninteresting for now.) The
dividend paying state is the one where the buyer’s wealth is at its lowest (eG
3 for Frank,
and f3G for Ellen). Hence, a risk averse buyer should fear this state. However the asset
pays a dividend in that very same state, so it winds up being a good hedge against the
buyer’s low wealth state. Therefore, we can think of the asset as a form of insurance.
For the moment, examine Frank’s situation. In period 2 he knows that three
G
states of the world could be possible: eB , eG
2 , and e3 , in which his initial wealth will be

30, 30, and 24, respectively. As a risk averse agent, Frank fears the risk of landing in
state eG
3 because his wealth will be at its lowest. Therefore, he will want to spread this
wealth out more evenly, sacrificing some of his wealth in states eB and eG
2 to gain more
in eG
3 . Comparing Table 3.7 with Table 3.6, we can see the asset does a good job of
G
smoothing out his wealth. Frank’s final wealth in states eB , eG
2 , and e3 is now much

more even: 28, 28, and 26 respectively. Thus, the asset is a good hedge against the
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buyer’s risk. Much of the subsequent analysis of welfare, especially that in Section 5,
relies on this intuition.

3.3.2

Asset demand under risk aversion

The model in Conlon (2015) is sufficient to produce a strong bubble, but unfortunately
it cannot say much about the welfare implications for buyers in a market where a
central bank deflates overpriced assets. Since the model in Conlon (2015) assumes that
each agent has a constant marginal utility in each state of the world, demand curves are
perfectly elastic, so there is no consumer surplus, and the discussion of the welfare
effects of bubble policy is necessarily limited to analysis of the sellers.
To provide a definite qualitative prediction about the welfare effects of general
deflation policy in the previous example, we recall the utility function presented in
equation (3.2). Each agent’s objective is to maximize the expected value of (3.2), given
his or her information. We have the following maximization problem

max E [Ui ] =
Xi,t

X
ω∈Pi,2



λ
π( ω) AWi,3 (ω) − Wi,3 (ω)2
2


(3.6)

where Wi,3 (ω) is the final wealth of each agent, and again is given by expression (3.4).
We need to maximize (3.6) cell by cell in the information partition. Since agents
cannot tell which state exists inside a given cell, Pi,t in their information partition,
Xi,t (ω) is constant over all ω ∈ Pi,t , so we’ll call it Xi,t . Carrying out the maximization
problem in (3.6) for a given information set Pi,2 gives the relevant first order condition

77

X
ω∈Pi,2



∂Wi,3 (ω)
∂Wi,3 (ω)
π(ω) Ai
− λWi,3 (ω)
=0
∂Xi,2
∂Xi,2

(3.7)

where Xi,2 is constant over Pi,2 .
Using (3.4), we can evaluate the derivative inside the brackets of (3.7). Doing this
gives us the agent’s sensitivity of final wealth to his/her sales:

∂Wi,3 (ω)
∂Xi,2

= p2 (ω) − d(ω).

Notice that this result is intuitive. If an agent sells one more unit of the asset, s/he
recieves the market price for the asset, but loses the dividend paid in state ω.
By way of illustration, consider a first-order condition with just two states of the
world, so ω ∈ {1, 2}, though it is trivial to extend the analysis to more states. Again,
agents cannot distinguish between ω = 1 and ω = 2 if they are in the same information
set, so p2 (1) = p2 (2) = p2 . Then, we have

h
i
h
i
π(1) A(p2 − d(1)) − λWi,3 (1)(p2 − d(1)) + π(2) A(p2 − d(2)) − λWi,3 (2)(p2 − d(2)) = 0
(3.8)
Substituting in equation (3.4) gives

h
i
π(1) A[p2 − d(1)] − λ(Mi,0 (1) + p2 Xi,2 + (ai,0 (1) − Xi,2 )d(1))[p2 − d(1)]
h
i
+ π(2) A[p2 − d(2)] − λ(Mi,0 (2) + p2 Xi,2 + (ai,0 (2) − Xi,2 )d(2))[p2 − d(2)] = 0

Let Mi,0 (ω) + ai,0 (ω)d(ω) = N (ω). This is the total wealth of each agent if they do not
trade, which henceforth will be referred to as the agents’ “no-trade wealth”. After some

78

simplification, the above equation becomes

h
i
h
i
π(1) [p2 −d(1)](A−λN (1))−λ[p2 −d(1)]2 Xi,2 +π(2) [p2 −d(2)](A−λN (2))−λ[p2 −d(2)]2 Xi,2 = 0

Moving the terms with Xi,2 to the right side gives








2

2
π(1) p2 −d(1) A−λN (1) +π(2) p2 −d(2) A−λN (2) = π(1)λ p2 −d(1) Xi,2 +π(2)λ p2 −d(2) X

Finally, factoring out Xi,2 and solving produces a “net demand curve” given by

h
i
h
i
π(1) (Ai − λN (1))(p2 − d(1)) + π(2) (Ai − λN (2))(p2 − d(2))
Xi,2 (pt ) =

2

2
π(1) p2 − d(1) + π(2) p2 − d(2)

(3.9)

where Xi,2 (pt ) represents demand for the asset as a function of the price prevailing in
the market. Since the demand curve is nonlinear in price, we must be careful that we do
not end up on a part of the demand curve that bends backwards. This problem appears
because the utility function (3.2) is quadratic. This means that there is a bliss point. If
the buyer, for example, faces a price that is sufficiently low, he or she may be able to
buy so much of the asset that it may put him or her on the downward sloping portion of
the utility function. Diminishing marginal utility will then cause the demand curve to
slope upwards since a falling price will cause buyers to buy less in an attempt to stay
near the bliss point (an obviously unrealistic situation for the agents). We consider
more realistic utility functions in Section 4 below, for which this is not a problem.
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3.3.3

The short-sale constraint, market clearing, and the price

Since Ellen and Frank are short sale constrained, they can only sell up to the amount of
the asset that they’re endowed with. This means that they can only sell up to their
asset holdings in that period, so Xi,t ≤ ai,t . If the constraint holds with equality, solving
(3.9) for pt gives a polynomial of order 2 in pt ,

ai,t λp2t

 h
i h
i
− 2λ π1 d1 + π2 d2 + π1 (A − λN (1)) + π2 (A − λN (2)) pt
i




h
+ λ π1 d21 + π2 d22 + π1 A − λN (1) d1 + π2 A − λN (2) d2 = 0 (3.10)

The demand curve in equation (3.9) is shown graphically in Figure 2. The solutions to
equation (3.10) occur at the intersections between the buyer’s demand curve and the
seller’s short sale constraint, labeled “SS constraint”. As can be seen, equation (3.10)
produces two solutions for the price of the asset, one where the demand curve is
downward sloping, and one where it is upward sloping. The intersection on the upward
sloping portion occurs when the buyer is to the right of his/her bliss point in at least
one state (on the downward sloping portion of his/her utility function). At this point
the trader is hurt by lower prices since they push him/her further away from the bliss
point. The trader can then make him or herself better off by buying less of the cheap
asset to stay close to the bliss point. Thus, this solution is unrealistic as an equilibrium.
The only sensible equilibrium point will lie where the demand curve is downward
sloping, at solution 1.
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Figure 3.3: An example demand curve

3.3.4

Bubble Policy

As in Section 2.3, we now posit the existence of a central bank which can credibly and
accurately identify when assets are overpriced. It reveals this information by announcing
when it observes overpriced assets (states b, eB , and f B ), so the price of the asset falls
to zero in these states. The period 2 prices will now be positive only in states eG
2 and
G
G
eG
3 , where Frank will buy from Ellen, and f2 and f3 where Ellen will buy from Frank.

The equilibrium prices in period 2, resulting from this new information partition,
are calculated using the pricing expression (3.10), and presented in Table 5. Since all
trade occurs in period 2, the period 1 prices are just the certainty equivalent of the
G
period 2 prices using equation (3.1), but including states eG
1 , and f1 , and the final

marginal utilities in from the policy equilibrium. Again, A = 15, and d = 4.
Once again, the elimination of overpricing in the market makes the buyers feel
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Table 3.8: Prices as Risk Aversion Rises

λ
p1
p2
0.0001 1.33 2.67
0.1
1.27 2.64
0.5
1.07 2.56
1.00
0.83 2.50
more secure. In other words, when the central bank has a general deflation policy, but
turns out not to announce that it observes overpriced assets, it is providing an implicit
endorsement of the asset’s price. As a result, the asset prices are higher in each period,
for each of the remaining states of the world. The pattern of trade remains the same as
in the bubble equilibrium, with the exception of states eB and f B where the price has
been pushed down to zero by the central bank.
As the buyer becomes more risk averse, the price still rises, but by less and less.
In the risk netural case (λ → 0), the price rises by $0.67 as a result of the general
deflation policy, as in Section 2.3 (recall the price was $2.00 in the bubble equilibrium).
However when buyers are modestly risk averse (λ = 1), the price rises by only $0.50.
This is surprising given our intuition about risk aversion. As the degree of risk aversion
rises, the buyer should fear low income states more. Since the asset is acting as
insurance against the low-income state, we expect the price to rise when risk aversion
gets higher. This awkward result is addressed in Section 3.6.
Although the period 1 prices are positive, the seller’s willingness to pay in period
1 still exceeds the buyer’s in all states. Thus in period 1, Ellen wants to buy from Frank
G
G
in states eG
1 , e2 , and e3 . However, recalling the assumption made in Section 2.1, Frank

cannot sell to Ellen because Frank does not have any of the asset to sell (and vice versa
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for Ellen in states f1G , f2G , and f3G ). Since the sellers are short-sale constrained, no trade
takes place in period 1.

3.3.5

Welfare Effects

The new, richer model presented above now allows us to relax the risk neutrality
assumption in AMP and Conlon (2015). With downward sloping marginal utility
curves, we can now generate welfare effects of the bubble policy by examining how
utility changes for buyers as well as sellers.
To calculate final utility from the general deflation policy, we must first calculate
final wealth. As an example, in state eG
3 , frank buys from Ellen and receives the
dividend. If λ = 0.5, then the period 2 price is 2.56, so his final wealth in this state is

P
WF,3
(eG
3 ) = 24 − 2.56 + 4 = 25.44

The remaining calculations proceed likewise. Table 3.9 shows the final wealths for both
agents in all states for λ = 0.5.
Table 3.9: Final wealths for risk averse agents after general deflation policy

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Ellen

28.67

26

30

26

28.56

28.56

20

27.44

25.44

Frank

28.67

30

26

20

27.44

25.44

26

28.56

28.56

As before, the asset is serving as a good hedge against the buyer’s income. Where
G
Frank’s initial wealth in states eG
2 and e3 was initially 30 and 24 respectively, it is 27.44

and 25.44 after the market.
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We can examine welfare effects of the policy by calculating utility in both the
bubble equilibrium and the bursting equilibrium. Utility in the bubble equilibrium is
calculated using the final wealths in Table 3.6, recalling that λ = 0.5, and A = 15. Since
π(ω) is equal for all states, expected utility, EUi is just the arithmetic mean of the
utilities. E Buyer contains four states f B , f1G , f2G , and f3G .

EUBuyer = [UE (28) + UE (20) + UE (28) + UE (26)]/4 = 217.5

G
G
E Seller = E GS ∪ E BS contains the other five states, b, eB , eG
1 , e2 , and e3 . Her

conditional expected final utility as a seller in the bubble equilibrium is

EUSeller = [UE (28.67) + UE (28.67) + UE (26) + UE (28) + UE (28)]/5 = 223.62

Similar calculations, using Table 3.9 for the general deflation equilibrium, yield

P
EUBuyer
= 217.04

and

P
EUSeller
= 223.34
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(3.11)

The welfare effects of the deflation policy can be found by taking the difference between
the conditional expected utilities from the two equilibria

P
∆EUBuyer = EUBuyer
− EUBuyer = −0.21

(3.12)

P
∆EUSeller = EUSeller
− EUSeller = −0.27

(3.13)

Calculations like those above for different levels of risk aversion are shown in
Table 3.10. As expected, in the near-risk neutral case there are no effects on welfare.
We calibrated the model such that this would be true for the sellers. For the buyers in
the risk neutral case, the marginal utility curves are flat, which implies that their
demand curves are perfectly elastic. In this case there is no consumer surplus before or
after the policy, so there are no changes in welfare either positive or negative.
Table 3.10: Changes in Utility as Risk Aversion Rises

λ
∆EUBuyer
0.0001 0.000
0.1
-0.040
0.5
-0.209
1.00
-0.437

∆EUSeller
0.000
-0.059
-0.274
-0.517

As risk aversion rises, however, both the buyer and seller become increasingly
and monotonically worse off.
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3.3.6

Discussion

The state in which the dividend is paid winds up being the state where the buyer’s
wealth is the lowest. As risk aversion rises, the buyer should fear the risk of the low
income state more and more. We expect that the buyer will have a higher willingness to
pay to smooth his/her wealth out, and bid a higher price for the insurance. Curiously
however, this is not what happens. The price the buyer is willing to pay actually falls as
the agents get more risk averse.
In period 2, the buyer knows that only two states of the world are possible.
G
Frank, for example, observes F BuyerP = {eG
2 , e3 }. If Frank is more risk averse he should

be willing to pay more to switch wealth from the high wealth state, eG
2 , to the low
G
wealth state, eG
3 , using the asset which pays a dividend in e3 . In other words, we would

expect the shadow value of switching wealth to state eG
3 to be increasing, so the
marginal rate of substitution between states 2 and 3 should also be increasing. Final
marginal utilities generated by the wealths in Table 3.9 are shown in Table 3.11.
Table 3.11: Final marginal utilities for risk averse agents after general deflation policy

State

b

eB

fB

eG
1

eG
2

eG
3

f1G

f2G

f3G

Ellen

1

2

0

2

0.72

0.72

4

1.28

2.28

Frank

1

0

2

4

1.28

2.28

2

0.72

0.72

The marginal rate of substitution is ratio of the marginal utilities in the two
G
states, eG
2 , and e3 :

M RSeG2 ,eG3 =
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M UeG3
M UeG2

Suppose λ = 0.1, and d(eG
3 ) = 4. Then in the general deflation policy equilibrium, the
marginal rate of substitution is

M RS =

2.06
= 1.94
1.06

(3.14)

If the degree of risk aversion rises to 0.5 (marginal utility curves get steeper), the MRS
becomes

M RS =

2.28
= 1.78
1.28

(3.15)

Contrary to what we expect, as risk aversion rises, the marginal rate of
substitution falls! This means that the shadow value of moving wealth from state eG
2 to
state eG
3 is also falling, so the price of the asset, which is serving as insurance against
state eG
3 , is falling as well when Frank becomes more risk averse. This is an awkward
result, and one that is contrary to our prior intuition about how the price of insurance
should behave when buyers become more risk averse. But we will show in Section 4 that
this result does not generalize to all utility functions, and is an artifact of choosing the
quadratic utility function to illustrate this particular example. The awkward result
arises from the fact that the quadratic utility function has increasing absolute risk
aversion. When wealth falls due to the policy, the agents become less risk averse, and
thus feel less inclined to shift wealth to the low-wealth state of the world. As a result
the price of the asset which is serving as insurance against the low-wealth state of the
world falls.
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3.4

Generalizing

In general, the numerical exercise above cannot be repeated for most utility functions.
This is because more general utility functions do not lend themselves to analytic
solutions. However, it is possible to derive numerical solutions using fixed point
methods.

3.4.1

The fixed point method

A constant x∗ is a fixed point of f (x) if and only if f (x∗ ) = x∗ . All functions that pass
through the 45-degree line are guaranteed to have at least one fixed point. Fixed points
can be attractive or non-attractive. Attractive fixed points can be found using iterative
strategies. Suppose a function has an attractive fixed point at x∗ and we choose a value
x sufficiently nearby. Then the sequence

x, f (x), f (f (x)), f (f (f (x))), ...

(3.16)

will converge to the fixed point, x∗ . As an example, the function in Figure 3.4 has two
fixed points. An attractive fixed point exists at x∗ , and a non-attractive fixed point at
the origin. For any choice of x > 0, the sequence (3.16) will converge to x∗ . The
non-attractive fixed point can only be found by setting the initial value to x = 0.
Lastly, not all functions have a fixed point. The function in Figure 3.5 does not
cross the 45-degree line. Thus, for any choice of initial value x, the sequence (3.16) will
not converge.
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Figure 3.4: Finding a fixed point through iteration

3.4.2

Finding solutions for more general utility functions using the fixed
point method

We can use the iterative method of finding attractive fixed points for more general
classes of utility. In this section we wish to consider whether the results in Sections 3.4
and 3.5 hold for more general utility functions. Here we examine a Constant Absolute
Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function,

U (w) = −e−λw

and a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function
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(3.17)

Figure 3.5: A function with no fixed points.

U (w) =

w1−λ
1−λ

(3.18)

We can apply the fixed point method described above to these new utility
functions by using sequence (3.16). The procedure is roughly the same as Section 3.3,
up to Section 3.2. We first back out the implied final bubble equilibrium wealths, and
the implied initial wealths using the assumed marginal utilities in Table 3.1. This step
does not require any fixed point calculation.
Next, to calculate prices under the deflation policy, we do not derive an analytic
solution for the price. Instead, we make a guess at the price and use this guess, together
with the initial wealths above, to derive the final wealths obtained in a manner similar
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to Section 3.1, and final marginal utilities in the policy equilibrium. Using equation
(3.1), we then calculate the new certainty equivalent price given the final marginal
utilities just calculated. We then iterate this process as in sequence (3.16), for the price
by using the previous solution for equation (3.1) as the new guess. This process is
repeated until the sequence of certainty equivalent prices converge, yielding x such that
x ≈ f (x). The results are presented in Table 3.12 along side the previous results for
quadratic utility. Once again we use the target bubble equilibrium marginal utilities
from Table 3.1 with z = y = 1 and x = 2/3, and the dividend is set to 4.9
Notice that the pattern described in Table 3.8 changes when we introduce new
utility functions. In the quadratic case, the price rises by less as the agents become
more risk averse because the marginal rate of substitution between states 2 and 3 is
getting smaller. But this doesn’t seem to make much sense. Recall that the buyer’s
G
wealth is very low in the dividend paying state (state eG
3 for Frank, and f3 for Ellen),

and the asset pays off in those same states, so it serves as insurance against the low
wealth states. But the quadratic utility results suggest that the buyer’s willingness to
pay for the asset, which is serving as insurance against the low wealth state, falls as the
buyer becomes more risk averse.
By contrast, for the CARA function, the price is invariant to risk aversion, and
the CRRA function produces the results we expect, where prices increase with risk
aversion. However, for all three functions, buyer welfare decreases, while seller welfare is
decreasing for the quadratic and CARA cases, but increasing for the CRRA case.

9

The CRRA function is undefined when λ = 1, so the results are shown up to λ = 0.99.
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λ
p2 M RS
0.0001 2.67 2.00
0.1
2.64 1.94
0.5
2.56 1.78
0.99
2.50 1.67

Quadratic
∆EUBuyer
0.00
-.04
-.21
-.43
∆EUSeller
0.00
-.06
-.27
-.52

p2 M RS
2.67 2.00
2.67 2.00
2.67 2.00
2.67 2.00

CARA
∆EUBuyer
0.00
-.06
-.27
-.49
∆EUSeller
0.00
-.04
-.23
-.66

p2 M RS
2.67 2.00
2.81 2.35
3.32 4.90
3.83 22.73

Table 3.12: Period 2 prices and utility loss for different utility functions

CRRA
∆EUBuyer
0.00
-.02
-.11
-.35

∆EUSeller
0.00
+.01
+.05
+.06

The puzzling result for the price is explained by the fact that the buyer’s degree
of absolute risk aversion is changing as the buyer’s wealth falls due to the policy. We
can use the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion to help us understand what is
happening here.
Define the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion as

ARA = −

U 00 (w)
U 0 (w)

(3.19)

The coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the quadratic utility function (equation
(3.2)) is

ARAquadratic =

λ
A − λw

The sensitivity of the ARA to an increase in wealth is



0

ARA (w)quadratic =

λ
A − λw

2
>0

Thus, risk aversion rises (falls) as wealth gets higher (lower). Recall that the policy
reduces wealth in period 2 for both states the buyer actually buys in. Thus, the buyer’s
risk aversion falls as wealth falls, meaning that the buyer cares less about the risk of the
low wealth state, and therefore reduces his willingness to pay for the insurance. This is
an awkward result, but it suggests that the behavior of price, as risk aversion rises,
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depends on the form of the utility function we assume. Perhaps other utility functions
yield more intuitive results.
When CARA utility is assumed, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is
invariant to changes in wealth. So in this case, as can be seen from Table 3.12, the
marginal rate of substitution and the price do not change as λ rises. This too, however
is a difficult result to reconcile with practical intuition. Finally, under CRRA utility,
ARA0 (w)CRRA < 0. Therefore, in this case, as wealth falls, risk aversion increases, the
marginal rate of substitution increases (the buyer fears the risk of the low wealth state
more), and the price paid for the asset rises.10
The factor that distinguishes each type of utility function is how the degree of
absolute risk aversion changes when wealth changes. Since the price goes up, buyers’
wealth falls in the states where trade occurs. How the degree of risk aversion changes as
the agents move along the marginal utility curve determines what happens to the
marginal rate of substitution between states 2 and 3, and therefore what happens to the
price. Following this line of thought, we have the following theorem.

Theorem 3.1. The marginal rate of substitution between buyers’ states under the policy
equilibrium will be decreasing in wealth if ARA is increasing in w, constant in w if ARA
10

Similar calculations to those above give us

−λ2 e−λw
=λ
λe−λw
Thus, ARA0CARA (w) = 0, so as expected, there is no effect of wealth on the degree of absolute risk
aversion, and the price rises the same for any choice of λ.
For CRRA utility,
ARACARA = −

ARACRRA =

λ
−λw−λ−1
=
−
w λ
w

so ARA0CRRA (w) = − wλ2 < 0, and CRRA utility exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion.
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is constant in w, and increasing in w if ARA is decreasing in w. Thus, as agents
become more risk averse, the price will decrease if ARA is increasing in w, remain
constant if ARA is constant in w, and incrase if ARA is decreasing in w.

Proof. Recall that M RS2,3 =

U 0 (w3 )
,
U 0 (w2 )

and that wealth is decreasing as a result of the

G
policy in both states of the buyer’s information set (for example F BuyerP = {eG
2 , e3 }).

The amount by which wealth falls is the same in both states because the buyer pays the
same price in both states. Call this change in wealth ∆wP , which, of course, is negative.
Differentiating M RS by the change in wealth,

U 0 (w2 + ∆wP )U 00 (w3 + ∆wP ) − U 0 (w3 + ∆wP )U 00 (w2 + ∆wP )
∂M RS
=
∂∆wP
[U 0 (w2 + ∆wP )]2

The denominator must be positive, so the sign of

∂M RS
∂∆wP

is controlled by the two terms in

the numerator.
If, for example, U 0 (w2 + ∆wP )U 00 (w3 + ∆wP ) < U 0 (w3 + ∆wP )U 00 (w2 + ∆wP ),
then

∂M RS
∂∆wP

< 0. Dividing both sides of the inequality by U 0 (·) gives us

U 00 (w3 + ∆wP )
U 00 (w2 + ∆wP )
<
U 0 (w3 + ∆wP )
U 0 (w2 + ∆wP )

Using the definition of Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion above, this can be restated as

ARA(w3 + ∆wP ) > ARA(w2 + ∆wP )
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(3.20)

Since we know that w2 > w3 , it must be the case that (3.20) implies that ARA is falling
with wealth (or conversely rising when wealth falls). Thus, for a utility function where
ARA is decreasing in wealth, it must be the case that a decrease in wealth causes the
marginal rate of substitution to rise, and therefore the price of the asset rises. The cases
where ARA(w3 + ∆wP ) = ARA(w2 + ∆wP ), and ARA(w3 + ∆wP ) < ARA(w2 + ∆wP )
follow similarly.


Given the undesirable properties of Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion (IARA)
and CARA utility functions, we focus the rest of the discussion on the case where utility
displays Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA). This leads us to Theorem 2.
Theorem 3.2. A general deflation policy will be welfare reducing for the buyer if
absolute risk aversion falls with wealth.

Proof. Suppose Frank is the buyer, and Ellen the seller. We know that in the bad seller
state, the general deflation policy causes Frank’s wealth to rise because the central bank
prevents him from buying a worthless asset. Define the gain in utility arising from not
purchasing the worthless asset to be equal to

U (wePB ) − U (weB ) = ∆UBF rank

If marginal utility is constant, we know that the utility curve is linear, so utility will rise
by exactly
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∆UBF rank = (p2 − pP2 (eB ))M UeB

where p2 is the price in the bubble equilibrium, and pP2 (eB ) is the general deflation
policy price in eB . We know that pP2 (eB ) = 0 so this becomes

∆UBF rank = p2 M UeB

Frank’s wealth will fall in Ellen’s good seller states because the policy causes the
price to rise. The expected utility loss from the increase in price is, similarly,

∆UGF rank = (pP2 (eG ) − p2 )M UeG2 + (pP2 (eG ) − p2 )M UeG3

G
where pP2 (eG ) is the price in eG
2 and e3 under the deflation policy (the price must be the

same in both states).
In the risk neutral case, the buyer’s utility does not change. Thus
∆UBF rank = −∆UGF rank , or

p2 M UeB = (pP2 (eG ) − p2 )M UeG2 + (pP2 (eG ) − p2 )M UeG3

Rearranging terms and simplifying the notation for price, we get

pP2 − p2
M U eB
=
p2
M UeG2 + M UeG3
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(3.21)

The left hand side of this equation is just the percentage increase in the price of the
asset due to the policy in the good seller states of the world, so this simplifies to

∆p2
M UeB
=
p2
M UeG2 + M UeG3

(3.22)

As Frank becomes more risk averse, then when the policy is passed, his wealth
G
rises in state eB , and falls in states eG
2 and e3 . Therefore his marginal utility falls in
G
state eB , and rises in states eG
2 and e3 . Thus, risk aversion causes the numerator of the

fraction

M UeB
M UeG +M UeG
2

to fall, and the denominator to rise, causing the overall value of the

3

fraction to fall. Meanwhile, from Theorem 1, the policy guarantees that

∆p2
p2

gets larger

if and only if the utility function is decreasing in absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Therefore for a DARA utility function, it must be the case that

M UeB
∆p2
>
p2
M UeG2 + M UeG3

(3.23)

p2 M UeB < (pP2 (eG ) − p2 )M UeG2 + (pP2 (eG ) − p2 )M UeG3

(3.24)

or, that

or in other words, the utility gain from the policy preventing Frank from buying an
overpriced asset in state eB is overwhelmed by the loss in utility from the price
G
increasing in states eG
2 and e3 . Therefore, when the utility function is decreasing in
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absolute risk aversion, it must be the case that ∆UBF rank < ∆UGF rank , and the policy is
welfare diminishing for buyers.

3.5



Conclusion

This model extends the basic model from AMP and Conlon (2015) to include risk
aversion. After deriving a bubble equilibrium and reverse-engineering it to back out the
initial wealths a risk averse agent would need to have in order to generate that particular
equilibrium, we use these initial wealths to find the corresponding equilibrium where the
central bank has deflated the overpriced assets by announcing when bad sellers are in
the market. While this policy will protect buyers from purchasing overpriced assets, it
harms them by causing them to pay higher prices in the states where no announcement
is made. We show, under the generally plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk
aversion, that this policy must be welfare diminishing for buyers in the asset market.
This result has serious implications for the debate surrounding central bank
policy concerning asset markets. In essence we have shown that even if the central bank
had good enough information to know precisely when assets in the market were
overpriced, it cannot help buyers in the market by protecting them from overpriced
assets. A policy of general deflation of overpriced assets helps buyers in states where
they would have bought an asset that was known to be overpriced, but hurts them in
states where the price rises due to the central bank’s elimination of the lemons problem.
Since buyers’ expected utility falls, it suggests this policy cannot, and should not be
employed by central banks.
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The policy’s welfare effects on the sellers are ambiguous. Under DARA utility, it
is possible that the sellers could be helped by the policy. However, ostensibly, this is
contrary to the policy’s stated goals since the policy still hurts buyers, and therefore
should not be argued in its defense.
Interestingly, the unintended consequences of bubble policy by central banks
presented in this paper seem to have been largely ignored by those arguing in favor of
these policies. The analysis in this paper suggests that these effects are large enough to
cause serious doubts about the policy’s ability to acheive its stated goals.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
For as long as asset markets have existed, they have been a source of intense curiosity
for the field of Economics. We believe that the results in this thesis have contributed to
the body of knowledge that currently exists.
We have shown that inside traders either did not or could not predict the 2008
stock market crash. This combined with previous results by Seyhun (1990) and Marin
and Olivier (2008) suggests that informational signals sent by inside traders behave
differently in wide spread financial crises than during normal times. This result deserves
closer examination in future work. Namely, it would be informative to see if the same
result holds once we have filtered routine traders out of the sample. We have also shown
that inside traders performed very well picking winners in the wake of the 2008 stock
market crash. This result, supported again by Seyhun (1990) suggests that insiders are
much more able to pick stocks after a market crash than during normal times. The
existence of large returns in the post-crash data suggests that investors may not be used
to dealing with crises, as the EMH suggests they should easily be able to arbitrage these
gains away. More research on precisely why these signals seem to be so much stronger
after a crash, and why investors do not seem to be able to eliminate these gains is
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needed to say anything definite. However this essay has provided an empirical base of
knowledge from which to work on.
We have also shown that asset market policy by central banks is more difficult
than it first seems. Even if a central bank has perfect information about whether an
asset is overpriced, it cannot help buyers by protecting them from the overpricing. This
suggests that buyers would prefer a world where the central bank ignores swings in asset
markets, to one where the central bank deflates overpriced assets. Further research on
this topic includes formalizing the effects of the general deflation policy on sellers in the
market, and what happens when we relax short sale constraints.
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